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Desiccated Determinism: A Reappraisal of Self-Determination Beyond National 
Sovereignty 
 
The notion of ‗self-determination‘ is enshrined in the founding documents of international law 
and most state constitutions as a means of legitimating the current state and supranational 
order. However, its precise definition and parameters are the subject of debate—both when 
understood from within the logic of the state system and from outside it. This thesis situates 
the ―classic‖ notion of self-determination within its particular historical position inside the 
international system, highlighting its deep tension with the norm of state sovereignty, before 
turning to critical political theory to unearth a definition of self-determination wherein its 
particular relationship to the state system and the total notion of sovereignty is relaxed. This 
conception of self-determination is, for the purposes of this thesis, termed ‗rhizomatic,‘ and 
applied to four case studies to demonstrate how it might be used to understand the 
possibilities created by recent political movements. The primary argument of this thesis is 
that, when understood inside the state system as a present or future ‗active‘ right, acts of 
determination reduce to the normative determinism of historically contingent relations of 
force because they are either resolved on the terms of existing actors within the constituted 
system or by the effectiveness of force they can exert to deny the system‘s function based on 
its previous rules. However, when understood beyond the closed logic of the state system, 
self-determination can be taken to mean manifestations of boundless constitutive power and 
collective imagination that unleash new vectors of possibility for human political relations. 
 
KEY WORDS: self-determination, state system, political theory, critical theory. 
 
 
Otopeli determinizem: prevrednotenje samoodločbe onkraj nacionalne suverenosti 
 
Termin samoodločbe je zapisan v ustanovitvenih dokumentih večine drţavnih ustav ter 
mednarodnega prava, prav tako pa predstavlja sredstvo za legitimizacijo drţave ter 
nadnacionalnega reda. Točna definicija in njeni parametri pa so v resnici stvar debate, ne 
glede na to ali izhajajo iz logike notranjosti drţavniškega sistema ali iz logike njegove 
zunanjosti. Magistrsko delo najprej sledi ―klasičnemu‖ pojmu samoodločbe v njegovi 
zgodovinski partikularnosti znotraj mednarodnega sistema, pri čemer poudari veliko napetost 
med samoodločbo in drţavno suverenostjo. Nakar se obrne h kritični politični teoriji, da bi 
izkopalo definicijo samoodločbe, pri kateri popusti poseben odnos samoodločbe z drţavnim 
sistemom in pojmom suverenosti. Takšno pojmovanje samoodločbe je za potrebe naloge 
poimenovano ―rizomatično‖ in se nato uporabi pri analizi štirih primerov z namenom, da se 
pokaţe, kako lahko tak pojem samoodločbe uporabimo za razumevanje moţnosti, ki jih 
vzpostavljajo najnovejša politična gibanja. Temeljni argument magistrskega dela je, da ko jih 
razumemo v okvirju drţavnega sistema kot sedanjo ali prihodnjo ―aktivno‖ pravico, se dejanja 
samoodločbe zreducirajo na normativni determinizem zgodovinsko kontingentnih odnosov 
sil, saj se bodisi ujamejo v pogoje obstoječih dejavnikov znotraj konstituiranega sistema 
bodisi njihovo uresničitev pogojuje učinkovitost sile, ki jo lahko izvršujejo, da bi izničili 
funkcije sistema, ki slonijo na obstoječih pravilih. Ko pa jo razumemo onkraj zaprte logike 
drţavnega sistema, lahko samoodločba pomeni izraţanje neomejene konstituirajoče oblasti in 
kolektivne imaginacije, ki sprosti nove vektorje moţnosti človeških političnih odnosov. 
 
              : samoodločba, drţavna ureditev, politične teorije, kritična teorija. 
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1 Introduction  
 
Sam, 
sam sem zrak in zlato maslo, 
lubje lipe, kralj, srp in kladivo, 
Dalmatinec, ţaga, Armenija, vitrih, 
sam. 
 
- From ―Sam‖ by Tomaţ Šalamun 
 
Alone, 
I alone am the air and the golden butter, 
linden bark, the king, the sickle and hammer, 
the Dalmatian, the saw, Armenia, the key, 
alone. 
 
- From ―Alone‖ by Tomaţ Šalamun 
Translated by Brian Henry  
 
Today, few would argue openly that humans should not govern themselves, but we can hardly 
agree on what that actually means. While nation-states draw up constitutions, social 
movements demand collective autonomy, far-right provocateurs demand freedom to incite, 
and dictators feel compelled to at least fake elections, there is room to disagree about nearly 
everything else. How collective or individual is the political subject—‗people‘ or ‗citizen‘? 
What types of activities comprise ‗governance‘ and ‗politics,‘ and which comprise ‗private‘ or 
‗social‘ life? Who should sort out conflicting political claims between individuals and 
communities, and according to what system?  
 
The resulting discussion centers on the principle of ‗self-determination,‘ the evocative notion 
of political order originating from, and remaining subservient to, those it applies to. But, 
though ‗self-determination‘ is referenced widely in today‘s (post-)modern context, its 
definition, and certainly also its rules, remain vague. In this thesis, I will attempt to locate the 
coordinates of what ‗self-determination‘ might mean, arguing that it can encompass political 
ideas beyond what the state system implies.  
 
The notion of ‗self-determination‘ is enshrined in the founding documents of international law 
and most modern state constitutions as a means of legitimating the current state and 
supranational order. The logic is that, because each political community has exercised a right 
to determine its own system of laws and norms, there exists a pseudo-contractual relationship 
between state authorities and communities they represent, and those authorities may in turn 
negotiate internationally on behalf of those citizens. Each state is sovereign in its own affairs, 
and unless it has voluntarily traded away some of its authority in international agreements, is 
bound only by the contract it has established with the citizens of the territory it controls. One 
thus joins a political community by birth, or by ―naturalization,‖ a process that simulates the 
rebirth of the individual as a political subject within that community. Even as international 
laws and norms grow thicker, the founding moment of determination is in that conclusion of 
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the contract between the citizen and the state as he or she is born or ‗reborn‘ as a child of that 
state‘s political community. 
 
But the state-based vision of self-determination has a problem. What if the bounds of some 
individual or collective ‗self‘ do not correspond to those of the state? What if an individual or 
group rejects the moment of birth and civic socialization as sufficient basis for contractual 
‗determination‘? At what point does inclusion in a representative, hierarchical, and absolute 
political order constitute domination and coercion rather than consent and self-rule?  
 
This problem is widely recognized. Many contemporary thinkers, across a wide spectrum of 
disciplines, have highlighted the problems of defining the boundaries of these communities 
and adjudicating criteria for inclusion or exclusion. But, with extremely marginal exception, 
all habitable territory on earth is currently controlled—at least formally—by a state, and new 
or unrecognized claims to sovereign self-determination in a particular territory thus must be 
subtractions from a state‘s jurisdictional authority. Therefore, while a right to self-determine 
might be central to the legitimation of the current state order, any new moments of its 
application are fraught with crisis.  
 
Most of the extant literature about this tension attempts to adjudicate ―legitimate‖ and ―non-
legitimate‖ claims to sovereign self-determination on the de jure basis of the state system. 
Political and legal theorists working on this challenge mostly aim to establish new norms and 
mechanics by which actors might claim statehood or autonomy, and thus provide a universal 
rule that might be applied to emergent claims. These form the basis by which most secession 
movements active today claim legitimacy. However, there also exists a genealogy of political 
theorists and actors, which gained fresh prominence in the late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 centuries, 
that endeavors to look beyond the constraints of the sovereign state order in search of a 
different notion of self-determination. This critical perspective argues that entirely new 
ontologies, values, and subjectivities may emerge spontaneously, bringing with them 
previously inconceivable ideas about political collectivity. These authors see these moments, 
not necessarily the emergence of new states, as the foundational points of political creation we 
might otherwise think of as ‗self-determination.‘  
 
For ease, I will term this strain of thinking ‗rhizomatic,‘ and will discuss why in greater detail 
later. However, my central claim is that these rhizomatic understandings of political agency 
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can offer something important to the academic, legal, and philosophical discussion of what 
constitutes ―political self-determination.‖ Without considering ideas that view the nature of 
self-determination as multiple and constitutive, invocations of political self-determination are 
to be understood within the particular, hierarchical context of the state system, and are thus 
either imperfect claims of autonomy, subject to all the same challenges of membership and 
domination therein, or are moments of secession. This means illegality and violence, resolved 
only by the constituted power of the state system—moments that preserve the current state 
structure, realize the hegemonic aims of already powerful states, or validate a deployment of 
effective violence. In effect, self-determination is then a concept that enshrines not normative 
and creative self-determination, but rather a retrograde determinism of force. 
 
1.1 Approach  
 
The main body of the thesis will be divided into Parts 2, 3, and 4. Part 2 will address the 
concept of sovereign self-determination as it is currently understood within the legal structure 
of the current state system. Part 3 will present a ‗rhizomatic‘ vision of political self-
determination, in which the concept is decoupled from its association with the state system, 
and reference an epistemology laid out mostly by 20
th
 and 21
st
 century critical theorists. Part 4 
will present four case studies of recent political movements, each of which models in some 
way, this ‗rhizomatic‘ conception of political self-determination. 
 
In Part 2, I will begin with a set of definitional coordinates for ‗classical‘ sovereign self-
determination and examine their particular relationship to the concepts of nation, nationalism, 
and decolonization. I will then present the core problem of sovereign self-determination, 
demonstrating the major tensions immanent to that approach. At the end of this section, I will 
briefly engage with recent legal literature about the application of the principle of self-
determination to claims of sovereignty, but will ultimately argue that new or unrecognized 
claims of sovereign self-determination can be resolved either in ways that replicate the 
relations of power that already exist in the current system or are measured by the ability of an 
actor to exact violence on the constituted order. 
 
In Part 3, I will largely rely on major works of critical political theory from a group of authors 
who share similar influences and epistemologies. This theoretical vision emerged in the late 
20
th
 and early 21
st
 centuries, primarily with the resurrection of the political ideas of Baruch 
Spinoza in the writings of thinkers such as Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Jacques Rancière, 
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Antonio Negri, and Michael Hardt. I will begin by exploring the notion of constituent power 
being ‗desiccated‘ by the state system in the writings of Negri (1992/1999), in that the 
originary power of political creation must remain ―behind glass,‖ while ―the nexus that 
historically links [it] to the right of resistance (and that defines, in a sense, the active character 
of the former) is erased‖ (p. 3). I will then explore the relationship of this notion to the idea of 
‗self-determination,‘ arguing that in its endless generative possibility, it can be best 
understood by applying the ideas of multiplicity and the rhizome from Deleuze and Guattari 
(1980/1987). In doing so, I will sketch out what I call ‗rhizomatic‘ self-determination, or 
those acts that manifest constituent power by creating new conceptions of the political that did 
not previously exist, and in doing so, make reference to Negri‘s reading of Spinoza 
(1981/1999) in the connection between rhizomatic possibility and collective political will. I 
will address the problem of subjectivity by turning to Rancière (1997/2010, 2005/2006), 
arguing that the ‗self‘ in this conception is produced concurrently with the new logic of 
political order. Lastly, I will consider the limitations of applying this idea to material case 
studies, and address the ideas of Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014) in acknowledging the 
need to look beyond Western scripts of political creation, arguing that we should only seek to 
uncover the future by examining vectors of political possibility that have recently been 
created, rather than attempting to project our existing logics to ‗predict‘ the shape of future 
acts of rhizomatic self-determination.  
 
In Part 4, I will present four short case studies, each of which includes a collective claim to 
political self-determination. In visiting each case, I will consider their parallels to the 
‗rhizomatic‘ idea sketched out in Part 3, and consider how the particular case might be 
understood relative to the state system and binary logics that might otherwise render them 
contradictory. First, I will consider the intersection of two political ideas in Catalonia, whose 
normative transversality generates new potential for collaboration and political creativity. 
Next, I will consider the Zapatista movement in Mexico, which advances an ontological 
project that has largely moved beyond the plane of territorial control and military contest with 
the state. Then, I will consider the case of Rojava, a regime of de facto autonomy in northern 
Syria that advocates bottom-up democratic autonomy and anti-systemic governance, but faces 
a number of ‗state-like‘ challenges in maintaining total territorial control. Finally, I will 
consider the case of movements in Ecuador and Bolivia that seek to fundamentally transform 
the state on the basis of plurinationality and by recognizing the worldviews and cultures of 
indigenous groups inside the state. 
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In a contemporary moment when the global state system and economy is beset by forceful 
challenges from all sides (including, sometimes, from within the very states that created it), 
perhaps now is the time to revisit our understanding of political self-determination. 
Broadening what we consider to be political self-determination, we may also be able to 
imagine ways to transform our own future. Must self-determination be, as it is understood 
from within the state system, defined by territorial claims of sovereign agency for a bounded 
political community? Or might it also be understood as something more radically creative? 
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2 Sovereign Self-Determination and the State System 
 
Before considering how political self-determination might be understood beyond its 
relationship to the state, I will first examine its place within the logic of the international 
system. In doing so, I will demonstrate the deep tensions created within the hierarchical logic 
of the state by the idea of self-determination, even as it is defined and applied by state actors 
(or those aspiring to become state actors). Its centrality is, of course, partially the product of a 
particular historical trajectory of political ideas and outcomes, but it is far from a litigated 
relic from a long-ago past. Instead, it serves a central role as a conceptual means to 
continually legitimate the system as it exists today, linking the concept of self-rule and 
representative democracy to the nation-state formation and defense of its sovereignty by 
means of an imagined contract of consent at some earlier moment of ―self-determination‖ 
between each human political subject and their state.  
 
In this part, I will first address how classical self-determination became a norm in 
international law, paying particular attention to its history as a synthesis of ideas of civic 
representationalism and national sovereignty within a single principle, and later, as a formal 
legal norm. Here, I will show how the norm‘s particular history vests it with association to the 
legitimation of new state creation—and thus secession—within a system that also treats state 
sovereignty as an equally crucial norm.  
 
Next, I will examine why self-determination as a principle is so vocally embraced by actors 
within the state system. I will argue that this is because the legitimacy of the modern state and 
international system rests on the idea that each state‘s citizens have themselves determined the 
boundaries and contractual terms of governance that they live under. Yet, I will also 
demonstrate how problems arise when this idea is considered creatively in a present or future 
light. Because it is largely coterminous with the problems of representative democracy writ 
large, I will thus argue that the idea of self-determination within a system that does not 
privilege it over state sovereignty is most comfortably understood as an imagined past act, 
rather than something that can be actively practiced in the present or future sense.  
 
Lastly, I will engage with some of the thinkers who, working within the logic of the state 
system, have attempted to evolve the principle of self-determination into a more consistent 
and coherent mechanism to adjudicate which claims to statehood are ‗legitimate‘ exercises in 
self-determination and which are not, or who offer normative means to address future claims. 
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Here, I will argue that their work, while certainly offering proposals to evolve the legal norm 
into something more consistently applicable within international law, still cannot fully 
encompass the idea of self-determination as a creative present or future act without prompting 
a reappraisal of state sovereignty altogether. 
 
2.1 Self-Determination as a Principle of International Law 
 
The history of self-determination as a principle—like the history of the state system itself—is 
a particular one, colored by evolving legal norms, historical outcomes, and the individual 
ideas of influential political actors. Article 1 of the United Nations (UN) Charter most 
famously articulates the ―classical‖ vision of self-determination that is enshrined in 
international law as a legal norm that exists to this day. In it, one of the most fundamental 
roles of the UN is to ―develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples…‖ (United Nations, 1945). This 
terminology—that of self-determining peoples and relations among nations—represents the 
cross-pollination of two particular European political histories. On the one hand, it gestures to 
concepts of representative self-rule as developed in antiquity, and repackaged by Renaissance 
thinkers and Enlightenment-era revolutionaries, and on the other, the parallel trajectory of 
communitarian justifications of national sovereignty resurrected during the period of 
nationalist revival movements in the 18
th
, 19
th
, and 20
th
 centuries. Though the membrane 
between these two political histories is certainly permeable, their collision in the classical 
principle of self-determination is a particular result of several centuries of interplay between 
these political ideas and historical outcomes.   
 
Wolfgang Danspeckgruber (2002) traces the underlying principles of consent and self-rule 
expressed in the UN Charter to the American and French revolutions (p. 4). This also entails 
the influence of republican and neoclassical ideas that inspired revolutionary thinkers, 
wherein the legitimation of state law, policy, and leadership derives solely from electoral 
participation, rather than divine mandate. The French Constitution of 1791 predicates French 
citizenship on either the hereditary passage of citizenship, or in the swearing of the republic‘s 
serment civique, a civic oath. It also subjugated the powers of the King to the civic law, 
formal allegiance to which the King was also required to swear. Though the First Republic 
was to last only until 1804, strong echoes can certainly be heard in classical conceptions of 
how self-determination manifests institutionally: a representative and contractual civic 
mandate. 
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In the American case, too, these basic ideas were also at work, but the act of political self-
determination itself was also a moment of collective self-creation. The declaration, ―We the 
People of the United States,‖ in the preamble of the United States (U.S.) constitution both 
proclaims the existence of the political entity, as well as the existence of the people. The 
justification of its existence is simply the common embrace of a particular register of political 
ideas and institutions and a specific individualist rationality. In the U.S. Declaration of 
Independence, its framers declared equal rights to be ―self-evident,‖ thus needing no further 
reduction. To an extent, the principle of self-determination is also an inheritor of this idea of 
self-evidence and the rationality of self-rule, logic that would also eventually grow to 
underpin the universalist project of international human rights and fuel some of the 
justifications used to legitimate secession. 
 
However, the shifting tides of state formation elsewhere in Europe followed a different path. 
As Chaihark Hahm and Sung Ho Kim (2015) point out, ―historically, the great democratic 
constitutions of the eighteenth century were quite the exception‖ (p. 17). Instead, the 
mechanism of the constitution became appropriated as a tool of monarchical restoration, as in 
the cases following the Congress of Vienna, or somewhat ironically, as imperial legitimation 
in the wake of Napoleonic conquest (Ibid.). The familiar challenges of defining ―popular‖ 
representation, delineating the boundaries of a people, and of conferring political subjectivity 
meant that institutions could then be created based on co-opted, misrepresented, or invented 
civic mandates and robust structures of colonial conquest maintained with nominal 
legitimacy.  
 
National movements, as they emerged, offered an alternative path unencumbered by these 
tensions. Benedict Anderson (1996) argues that, already by the time of the French Revolution, 
most ―key concepts were understood globally–progress, liberalism, socialism, republicanism, 
democracy, even conservatism, legitimacy and later fascism,‖ but that nationalism was a 
poorly-defined idea with little philosophical basis, which could only be understood 
―comparatively and globally,‖ and could only be felt and politically operationalized by those 
under the influence of a particular strain of it (p. 2). Miroslav Hroch (1985) characterizes the 
early revival of these movements as ―struggle against absolutism, bourgeois social revolution 
and the rise of capitalism,‖ propagated by a ―vanguard‖ of early actors who strung together 
threads of language, culture, and history to build, spread, and nourish the awakening of 
national consciousness (p. 22). The legitimacy of statehood was derived from the political will 
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of the primary national group within. Membership in this group was inherited and the people 
an undeniable constant through space and time. Though the nation certainly appeared in 
earlier conceptions of self-rule, this character as a fixed, inherited, and historical membership 
offered a simple rallying cry and organizing principle for very different episodes of European 
state-building (Danspeckgruber, 2002, p. 2).  
 
A synthesis was required. After the catastrophic collisions of nationalism and empire in the 
First World War, new projects of interstate coordination like the League of Nations gained 
traction as a means to forestall more bloodshed. To peacefully adjudicate claims of statehood, 
questions of membership and mandate needed to be solved. This was a crucial moment for 
what became the ―pre-classical‖ principle of self-determination: the explicit embrace of 
nationhood as grounds for sovereignty, alongside self-rule as a consented compact of civic 
mandate. Antonio Cassese (1995) credits Lenin‘s 1916 Theses on the Socialist Revolution and 
the Right of Nations to Self-Determination as ―the first compelling enunciation of the 
principle‖ that nationality could be reconciled with the universal cause of democratic 
socialism (pp. 15–17). At the same time, he credits American President Woodrow Wilson 
with the international elevation of the cause of national self-determination, and identifies this 
as the moment where notions of the popular civic mandate entered the formula. Cassese 
writes that, for Wilson, ―self-determination was the logical corollary of popular sovereignty; it 
was synonymous with the principle that governments must be based on the ‗consent of the 
governed‘‖ (Cassese, 1995, p. 19). This consent was to be secured within states based on 
ethno-national community membership, which either guaranteed the rights of bounded 
minorities or were to be restructured to turn minorities into majorities—based on the claims 
advanced by these communities themselves. Yet, Ivor Jennings (1956) famously decried this 
as a ―ridiculous‖ means to govern the restructuring of the entire interwar state system: ―On the 
surface, it seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous, because the 
people cannot decide until someone decides who are the people‖ (pp. 55–56).  
 
The membership problem was back, juxtaposing questions of popular self-rule with ethnic 
and national membership, and running them up against the questions about the demarcation of 
physical boundaries that were necessary to consider if self-determination was to be invoked to 
avoid future bloodshed in wars of territorial control. Despite the supposedly universal nature 
of this principle, Anthony Whelan (1994) highlights that, ―the Wilsonian principle does not 
disclose any test which applied in the drawing of such crucially important lines‖ (p. 103). 
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Indeed, this idea largely reduces to the drawing of boundaries based on where they already 
are, or it is determined they should be based on historical rights to territory advanced by 
ethno-national groups. The project to match a nation with ―its homeland‖ was all the more 
necessary by this logic, and to a great extent, existing internal or external political boundaries 
were to be the default mode to carve out new states. Anne Peters (2014) demonstrates the 
subsequent development of the legal principle of uti possidetis (from the Roman legal statute 
privileging the ―existing state of possession of immovable‖) into a core facet of international 
law in the early modern era (p. 98). When this principle was applied to the realm of 
international law, it meant that the territorial boundaries of previous political entities were to 
serve as the basis for fixing the boundaries of successor states.  
 
Next, this ―pre-classical‖ model of self-determination—self-rule, within a bounded area of 
territorial sovereignty, conferred on an ethno-national basis to those who the extant states of 
the world order deemed deserving—was to transform from the influential position of the 
American President to a set of international norms undergirding the entire state system. 
Though the interwar order was unable to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War, 
Cassese notes that, in the Atlantic Charter concluded in August of 1941, the U.S. and the 
United Kingdom ―proclaimed self-determination as one of the objectives to be attained and 
put into practice at the end of the conflict‖ (Cassese, 1995, p. 37). The failure of the interwar 
system may have formally spelled the end of ‗ethno-national‘ self-determination and minority 
rights as an emerging norm, but at the end of the war, an array of national states stood as the 
inheritors of the legacy of contractual and representational government. After the war, 
throughout negotiations of the UN Charter, many of these states raised objections to the 
inclusion of the principle of self-determination (citing many of the tensions raised by the pre-
classical model), asserting the charter should embrace a right of self-government within 
existing states, rather than the principle of self-determination and its murky legacy as a 
mechanism of state creation and legitimation. But ultimately, the language proposed by the 
Great Powers was accepted as Article 1(2) and enshrined self-determination as a principle 
within treaty law as an international norm, but stopped short of defining the precise meaning 
or any resulting obligations on member states or what it should mean for the recognition of 
claims to statehood (Cassese, 1995, p. 43). As such, in ―the self-determination of peoples,‖ 
was gone an explicitly ethnic, national, or minority-based conception of concluding 
arrangements of statehood, but the residue of nationalism was thick in the initial moments of 
―self-determination‖ that created many of the states that created the norm. And thus, though 
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the norm of self-determination‘s formal linkages with the concept of ―nationhood‖ are 
severed in the classical model, the ethno-national foundations of most modern states make it 
exceptionally difficult to disentangle many claims of sovereign nationality from that of 
sovereign statehood, even to the present day. 
 
The classical definition of self-determination was, in a turn that many of ―those who drafted it 
could not have foreseen,‖ next applied to the decolonization struggle (Cassese, 1995, p. 44). 
Classical self-determination was once again applied to something more historically particular, 
serving as a key mechanism for legitimating claims of colonial independence within the UN‘s 
1960 decolonization guidelines. GA Resolution 1541 sketched out the physical terms of such 
new claims to statehood based on the idea that statehood should be afforded to any claimant 
territory ―which is geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the 
country administering it‖ (United Nations, 1960). This gave rise to ―the salt-water thesis,‖ 
which held that a territory would only be considered able to invoke self-determination if its 
main administration occurred from across an ocean. Uti possidetis was to determine the shape 
of these newly self-determining territories, and the ―people‖ within. However arbitrary, there 
was now a governing norm, a specific rule, and a system to apply it. Self-determination—the 
legal norm, and the means of legitimating a new claim to statehood—reached the apex of its 
creative power.  
 
Or did it? The terms of the civic mandate to be established in each new state were hazy, and 
international recognition was afforded to many states that took shape as corrupt and violent 
regimes. And when ‗salt-water‘ claims were exhausted, what was self-determination to mean? 
Marc Weller (2008) points out the problem: this particular application takes form as an 
exception to the idea of territorial sovereignty of existing states, ―it is applied only to colonial 
and non-self-governing territories, of which practically none remain‖ and ―the exception is 
framed so narrowly that it does not apply to many or any situations of struggle for 
independence outside of the colonial context‖ (p. 34). Furthermore, though the principle was 
applied to 72 cases of non-self-governing territories and 11 trust territories after 1945, Weller 
identifies 78 ―major violent self-determination conflicts‖ that arose out of disputes within 
former colonies or non-self-governing territories, which claimed either ethno-national 
misrepresentation or the wrongful application of uti possidetis in delimiting the boundaries of 
territorial control (Weller, 2008, p. 19). Clearly, decolonization was a time-bound exception, 
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and a permutation of the principle that did not neatly conform to either the ethno-national or 
civic visions of self-determination.  
 
In the intervening decades, even as the classical principle of self-determination was invoked 
in new UN documents, and recognized as a core norm of international law time and again, the 
logical tensions that afflict it have limited the creation of new instances of its legal application 
to adjudicate claims of statehood. As Cassese puts it, ―the acceptance of the principle into the 
realm of law has therefore been selective and limited in many respects‖ (Cassese, 1995, p. 
317). If new or unrecognized invocations of self-determination as the grounds for recognition 
of an independent state amount to claims of secession (and, if we accept that almost all 
habitable territory on earth is controlled by a state, then new or unrecognized claims that 
entail a territorial dimension must be), they pose a major problem. After all, within a system 
foundationally structured to protect the territorial sovereignty of the existing regime of nation-
states, does it make sense to construe a foundational norm as one that allows for that 
sovereignty to be contested? From that angle, self-determination as a legal norm for state 
creation appears to be an existential contradiction for the entire system it sits within.  
 
2.2 Self-Determination and the Legitimation of the State System 
 
Surely the international legal norm, in all its implied power to fuel emergent claims of 
secession, strikes a discordant tension with the inviolable norm of state sovereignty. Yet, at 
the same time, the principle of self-determination lives another life: it cannot be ignored or 
omitted because it is necessary to sustain the state system‘s legitimacy and cohesion. As 
Weller writes, ―governments have an interest in perpetuating the legitimizing myth of 
statehood based on an exercise of the free will of the constituents of the state—their own 
legitimacy depends on it‖ (Weller, 2008, p. 14). In this sense, self-determination plays a key 
role in this ‗creation myth,‘ and in its absence, the state formation itself appears illegitimate. 
 
To understand why, it is useful to examine a logic that largely follows the histories I sketched 
out earlier. If the state is both sovereign and the sole arbiter of coercion and private ownership 
within its territory, its legitimacy must come from somewhere. Without the logic of divine 
mandate that underpinned centuries of feudalism, it must then derive legitimation from some 
relationship with the people that it calls citizens. Otherwise, it would constitute a naked 
exercise of domination. 
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In one conception, that of the civic popular mandate, the state relationship is characterized by 
contractual consent. The founding document, a constitution, creates the state and, in some 
cases, creates the people. Membership is secured by acceding to the contract, either by birth 
and civic socialization within the common institutions of the state, or by meeting criteria 
established by the state and swearing an oath—―rebirth‖ by naturalization. The founding act 
bounds and determines the governance arrangement of the collective ‗self,‘ and acts of 
naturalization extend those boundaries and indicate acceptance of the representative 
governance arrangement by those who recreate themselves as members of the community. At 
its founding, this is something more radical, creative, and revolutionary than, for example, 
securing an arrangement of autonomous self-government from a willing monarch who 
reserves the right to revoke any powers he or she sees fit. Rather, it inverts the logic of 
legitimacy, which now rests temporally in the moment of contractual consent: the moment of 
self-determination. 
 
In the nationalist conception, questions of boundedness and membership morph into 
something fixed and explicitly ethno-cultural. Yet, the representational mechanisms of state 
legitimation are similar. The people, which already exists, decides how it is to be represented 
by the state, and the state thus derives its legitimation from the primary national community it 
embraces. Minorities are to be afforded rights of autonomy (though not sovereignty), and 
usually only if they cannot be assigned their own state and thus transformed into a majority 
nation. This conception is less explicitly contractual, but in practice, it entails the acceptance 
of a similar representationalism because the process of formalizing membership occurs as the 
institutions are constructed. In effect, establishing the regime of governance constitutes the 
moment of self-determination in this reading as well.  
 
At this point in the logic, where all states represent contracts of self-determination and all 
territory on earth is perfectly divided, states can now begin to build a supranational order that 
represents a second level of contractual consent. For, until now, all states are bound simply by 
the arrangements they have concluded with the citizens of the political community they 
represent. Now, if the terms of their contract allow and they deem it in the interest of their 
citizens, they can begin to bind their actions on the basis of an international legal order. If a 
state trades away any dimension of agency against the terms of its contract, it destroys its 
legitimacy. This means, unless it has reserved rights to territorial secession (as, for example in 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslav constitutions), then any diminishment of its territory or 
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mandate is also against the terms of its original contract (Weller, 2008, p. 49). For this reason, 
the cohesion of the interstate system relies on the same logic as the legitimacy of the state: a 
‗founding moment‘ of self-determination creates a contract, which also binds the state‘s 
actions beyond its own borders, allowing it to legitimately negotiate at an international level. 
 
Aside from the obvious challenges with application, there are a number of tensions immanent 
to this universalistic logic. The first is the so-called ―boundary problem‖ of democratic theory, 
first termed as such by Frederick Whelan (1983). Roughly speaking, this refers to the 
challenge of demarcating the ―appropriate constitution of the people or unit,‖ if all political 
subjects within a democratic community are to be thought of as equal (Whelan, 1983, p. 13). 
This is especially true within the logic of civic representationalism, wherein the people 
establishes itself and its terms of governance the moment of self-determination, recognizing 
each other as equal political subjects within a common collective ―self.‖ But this also means 
that boundaries of territory and membership must be formally delineated, an act that excludes 
others and possibly claims ownership of territory that was previously controlled by another 
political entity. As Sarah Song (2012) points out, this means that the boundary is decided by 
the ―contingent forces of history‖ and violence, rather than by some universal logic of self-
determination (p. 40). Nationalism offers a ―pre-political‖ way to avoid these questions, by 
claiming that the people is already bounded, with some existing historical right to territory 
existing at the moment of contract with the state (Ibid.). As mentioned before, each nationalist 
claim might be understood as wholly particular and not governed by an overarching logic of 
legitimation—each member of a nation is equal to each other member of the nation, and the 
nation‘s boundaries are fixed—so the act of exclusion of others to membership and territory is 
legitimate by the terms of the particular claim. But the problem reoccurs when nationalist 
claims (particularly to territory) overlap or exist in opposition to the current order, and 
because of their particularity, no universal test or reading of history exists to adjudicate which 
claims are legitimate.  
 
Another tension has to do with the particularities of representational logic. After all, these 
constitutions are predicated on the assumption that they somehow represent the will of the 
―people‖ who enter into the agreement. Usually, this is validated by some representational and 
electoral mechanism—a referendum or the assumption that previously elected or designated 
representatives are negotiating in the interests of all. But any dissent, unless shared by a 
majority of the people, will be ignored, despite the fact that those who vote against the 
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agreement will still be bound by it. This confers a very specific collectivity on the notion of 
―self‖ – that of a majority of a particular group, rather than all people that comprise a people, 
even though the state will continue to interact with them as individual subjects. It is not hard 
to imagine why this might become a problem for an indigenous or minority community.  
 
There is also an issue of temporality here: the contract created at the moment of self-
determination is meant to exist indefinitely, and thus to preserve the state‘s legitimacy 
throughout time. And though state constitutions generally include provisions for change and 
amendment, a subset of the citizens bound to the contract cannot simply withdraw consent 
based on their evolving priorities. As new generations are born and are socialized as political 
subjects, they are automatically bound to the terms of the contract and have no discrete 
moment to affirm their consent, and thus, the ―self‖ is fixed throughout time, even when none 
of the political subjects who concluded the contract are still bound by it. They can only be, in 
effect, contracts with a ―determining‖ self at one point in history, and that ―self‖ must 
somehow regenerate its political subjectivity with each new member of the community in 
order for the state to legitimately persist. 
 
To a large extent, these problems are the same as those faced by the idea of representational 
institutionalism in general. The tensions are, again, created by the totality and hierarchy 
implied by the maintenance of sovereignty. The state‘s power to exercise coercion allows it to 
repel challenges to its authority as a means of sustaining the imagined consensual contract, 
but it also fixes it in a normatively powerful role as the highest form of legitimacy. Self-
determination is, when imagined in the past, the underwriter of this legitimacy. However, 
when imagined in the present or future, it is an existential challenge to the existing order. So 
self-determination, when understood in the perfectly universalistic terms I laid out earlier, 
must be a prior act, fixing a system of governance in perpetuity, and if that system provides 
some permeability to change, then acts of self-government might be absorbed into the course 
of the state‘s behavior. However, if a further act of self-determination occurs beyond the 
specific terms of the current order—even if it is practically identical to the same types of acts 
that predicated the creation of the extant state formation—it becomes one of illegality and 
subversion. 
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2.3 Solving for Sovereign Self-Determination 
 
Awareness of this tension is certainly nothing new. There exists a great volume of scholarship 
that attempts to identify usable mechanisms to adjudicate claims of new state creation (i.e., 
secession) by examining the legal precedent implied by the international norm I discussed in 
Section 2.1. Below, I will consider some of these arguments. First, I will discuss the 2010 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion about Kosovo‘s unilateral declaration 
of independence, which is arguably the most significant post-colonial application of the norm 
of self-determination in formal international law. Then, I will discuss a few approaches to 
ease the tension of this norm with that of sovereignty. Though I do not intend for this to be an 
exhaustive review of the entire literature
1
, I will argue that, while many scholars offer useful 
ideas to more consistently apply the international legal norm, none can conclusively resolve 
the normative tension created by active present or future conception of self-determination and 
the principle of state sovereignty.    
 
Following the 2008 unilateral declaration of independence of the Republic of Kosovo, the UN 
General Assembly adopted a resolution initially proposed by Serbia that requested an 
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice about whether the declaration had 
violated international law (United Nations, 2008). The case of Kosovo was unique in recent 
history because ―a large number of states supported a move towards independence that 
happened against the will of the territorial sovereign (Serbia)‖ and in possible contravention 
of an existing UN Security Council resolution (Oeter, 2015, p. 51). After taking up the case, 
the court ruled that the declaration did not violate international law and upheld that ―general 
international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence‖ 
(International Court of Justice, 2010). Additionally, it ruled that the Security Council, which 
had effectively superseded Serbia‘s legal authority in the territory with Resolution 1244, ―did 
not reserve for itself the final determination of the situation in Kosovo and remained silent on 
the conditions for the final status of Kosovo‖ (Ibid.). As such, the court cut a thin line 
                                                        
1
 In this section, I am solely considering approaches to so-called ―external‖ self-determination, which is defined 
in contrast to ―internal‖ arrangements of self-determination. This set of solutions includes the conclusion of 
autonomy arrangements, guarantees of special minority rights, structures of local decision-making, etc. Much 
work has been done on this topic, and many such arrangements are active worldwide. However, for the purposes 
of this discussion, we are looking for the most fundamental challenges to the state formation—that is, when the 
principle of self-determination comes into direct tension with the principle of sovereignty because the claimants 
entirely reject the state authority, rather than accepting an arrangement by which the state agrees to devolve 
certain powers or rights to a particular group or territory. ―Internal‖ self-determination does not interrupt the 
ultimate sovereignty that lies with the state (which can always rescind these arrangements), and it poses a 
related, but ultimately different, set of problems that lie beyond the main scope of this section.  
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between the temporary suspension of Serbia‘s legal authority in Kosovo and the formation of 
a new political entity. In this sense, the ruling was clearly a deliberate attempt to tread lightly 
on both the general principles of sovereignty and self-determination—and, as Christopher 
Walter (2014) puts it, ―even if the Advisory Opinion did deliberately leave open the hot issue 
of a right to secession, it may have contributed de facto to the acceptance of the practical 
result in the case at hand‖ (p. 15). Many states that advocated on behalf of the declaration saw 
it similarly. The U.S., one of the most vocal backers of the Kosovar independence bid, took 
the position that the case was entirely sui generis and created absolutely no precedent 
whatsoever (Bancroft, 2008).  
 
However, it is hard to imagine that the involvement of an international legal body would not 
create precedent. In that vein, Walter identifies significant ―law-making‖ capacity in the 
decision based on the centrality of previous ICJ Advisory Opinions in the development of 
international law, which when considered by such a body, cannot simply be considered 
functional dispute resolution (Walter, 2014, p. 13). Thus, though the dynamics of the Kosovo 
case might remain particular, there is clearly a legal and normative question generated by the 
outcome: does this mean that a right to secession exists within the terms of the current 
international state system?  
 
One argument raised by some scholars considering the Kosovo case is the idea of a right to 
so-called ―remedial‖ secession, which would be constituted when ―a central government 
persistently and systematically represses a territorially organized, and perhaps also 
constitutionally recognized, segment of the population‖ (Weller, 2008, p. 59). In that light, the 
Kosovar declaration might be recognized as legitimate on the basis that it comprised ―a sort of 
retribution for the hostile acts committed by the Milošević regime at the turn of the 
millennium‖ (Burri, 2014, p. 139). If evolved into a norm, this would mean that the principle 
of self-determination could be privileged over that of state sovereignty in the cases where they 
where the state systematically commits repressive acts some or all of its population. It would 
effectively remain an ―an emergency right that is applicable only under extreme 
circumstances of necessity‖ (Oeter, 2014, p. 63). However, the ICJ deferred consideration of 
this argument in its ruling, stating that consideration of the general norm was ―beyond the 
scope of the question posed by the General Assembly‖ (International Court of Justice, 2010).  
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To some degree, this follows the logic used to justify the use of force in humanitarian 
interventions under the ―responsibility to protect‖ concept. This principle holds that 
―sovereignty implies the responsibility of a state to protect its own population,‖ and that a 
responsibility of other states to intervene is activated when ―a state is unwilling or unable to 
meet its responsibility‖ (Walter, 2014, p. 17). However, beyond the difficulties in evolving 
some universal criterion for identifying this point and the checkered history of this norm‘s 
actual application, it also differs in a crucial regard from the idea of remedial secession: a 
state/non-state actor distinction. Remedial secession would imply that a non-state group, one 
that may not have formally established a contractual compact with those it aspires to 
represent, could exercise force with the same legitimacy as a state formation that is bound by 
the terms of legitimacy I discussed in Section 2.2. Furthermore, as Timothy Waters points out 
in a forthcoming work, recognition of persecution by the state is usually only possible contra 
a group with ‗identifiable characteristics,‘ which often take the shape of national minorities or 
particular ethnic populations (Waters, 2018). This returns the norm to its ethno-national 
conception and may create a perverse incentive on the part of a secession movement to risk 
greater uses of force against the people they claim to represent (Ibid.).  
 
Another scholarly approach involves advocating the inclusion of formal mechanisms for 
political re-organization in a state‘s constitution. In effect, this legislates a right to secession 
for the individual political units that comprise the larger state. There are a fair number of 
actual examples of this arrangement: the 1947 Union of Burma constitution, the 1994 
Ethiopian Constitution, and classically, the 1977 constitution of the former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR), which guaranteed the free right of secession for each of the 
individual SSRs (Weller, 2008, p. 49). Interestingly, another included the constitution of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), which guaranteed secession rights for each 
nation within the state, and viewed each of the federal republics as ―the political expression of 
the constituent nations‖ (Weller, 2008, p. 51).  
 
Weller points out that, in the wake of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Kosovo lost its federal 
representation and was effectively more legally subordinate to Serbia, becoming ―submerged‖ 
and facing repression of its ethnic Albanian majority (Weller, 2008, p. 53). Here, Kosovo 
again demonstrates a significant challenge to this approach. Its government structures found 
no success in claiming self-determination on the basis of constitutional right that existed 
under the Yugoslav constitution, and the government in Belgrade invoked the sovereign rights 
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of territorial integrity to maintain control. Without previous recognition of a bounded political 
group and regime of territorial control within the existing constitution, new entities and 
territories cannot hope to claim statehood according to this approach. Peters, in her discussion 
of uti possidetis, points out that, by only privileging the right to secession of first-level 
political sub-units in a constitutionally federal structure, ―the fiction was upheld that below 
that level, no ethnic or social differences exist which would demand the further fragmentation 
of territories‖ (Peters, 2014, p. 121). Many of the de facto states that exist in the territory of 
the former USSR fall into this category: their claims are based on ethno-national affiliation 
not endowed with a titular first-level republic or comprise territorial claims that were not 
coincident with such a republic. Further claims of statehood that ran counter to the established 
constitutional order would be considered violations of the existing state‘s sovereignty.  
 
Another approach includes strengthening the international norms of formal state recognition. 
Stefan Oeter (2014) advocates this approach, which would see international recognition 
moving ―from an instrument of bilateral diplomacy which governs state-to-state relations into 
a legal act of a collective nature, based on a normative value judgment regarding whether a 
new political entity conforms to basic normative underpinnings of the international legal 
order‖ (pp. 65–66). This would entail more formal codification within international law, 
regardless of the particular context, of what constitutes ―acceptable‖ standards for collective, 
coordinated recognition, which could then become a ―a tool in political conflict management‖ 
(Oeter, 2014, p. 64). (Echoes of this argument are present in the otherwise non-analogous 
conception of the European Union (EU) membership process—wherein a state‘s attainment of 
certain codified development criteria entitles it to stratified levels of candidate status—as a 
‗carrot‘ that can induce certain state behaviors desired by existing EU member states).  
 
This approach, however, implies the existence of what Weller identifies as an ―effective 
entity,‖ which cannot claim legitimate secession on the basis of classical or remedial 
applications of self-determination, but ―manages nevertheless to exhibit the criteria necessary 
for statehood (that is, territory, population, and effective government)‖ (Weller, 2008, p. 70). 
In the cases that Oeter considers, mostly those of de facto states, the claimants do indeed 
possess the trappings of statehood, and in exerting exclusive military control, might indeed be 
the only representative structures in the territory that are even able to conclude consensual 
governance contracts with the people living there. Yet, once again, these cases represent the 
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military outcomes of ―frozen conflicts,‖ rather than creative and normative principles that 
might be applied actively by new claimants (Lynch, 2004, p. 6).  
 
All three of these approaches largely apply to exceptional cases: state misbehavior, pre-
existing protection of secession for very particular entities, and historically contingent 
military outcomes, respectively. There is, however, another strain of recent scholarship that 
appears arguably more protective of the creative, normative legitimacy of secessionist claims 
writ large: self-determination on a purely territorial basis. Lea Brilmayer (1991) argues that, 
based on the norms of international law, ―the mere fact that a secessionist group constitutes a 
distinct people does not by itself establish a right to secede… to be persuasive a separatist 
argument must also present a territorial claim‘ (p. 179). In effect, secessionist claims are not 
simply ―a relationship between peoples and states,‖ but actually, ―a relationship between 
people, states, and territory‖ (Ibid.). As such, though it proposes a basis for an ongoing 
present and future right, this articulation clearly suffers from many of the afflictions of the 
pre-classical approach to self-determination: who adjudicates a ―distinct‖ people, and by what 
criteria might they be judged to have a legitimate relationship to territory? But, this logic has 
been updated and pushed further. For example, Waters proposes another active right based on 
a territorial approach that manages to avoid some of these thorny issues. His vision is a right 
to secession on the simple basis that groups living in particular territory may hold a statehood 
referendum without any need to share any existing terms of cultural or historical affiliation. 
Constructing a territorial norm like this would, indeed, vest more iterative power in a present 
and future right of secession that more consistently re-visits the moment of self-determination 
that underpins state sovereignty. What these (and other) territorial referendum mechanisms do 
not aspire to do, however, are to resolve the tensions between sovereignty and self-
determination. Even in this conception, political self-determination ends at the point where it 
normatively challenges the international system altogether, and the willingness to recognize 
rights remains a prerogative of the state. 
 
2.4 Determination or Determinism?  
 
As such, while most modern thinkers imagining self-determination as relative to the state 
system propose some evolution of the legal norm of self-determination, none are able to 
altogether resolve the tension this poses with the principle of sovereignty. Within all of the 
approaches I considered in Section 2.3, political self-determination is limited to that of a 
direct territorial challenge to the state‘s sovereignty, though underpinned by different 
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justifications. Nevertheless, this is important because political self-determination thus remains 
an explicit matter of property, which can be settled within the hierarchy of the state system as 
it exists. Sovereignty remains absolute. Compelled by sentiment of its citizens or by 
international norms, the state might be permeable and sympathetic to certain demands to 
restructure the terms of its control—always, however, on its own terms as the ultimate 
sovereign authority. But when this is not the case and the state is antagonistically challenged 
on a dimension of ownership (territory, resources, authority, human capital, etc.), its 
acceptance of a secessionist claim amounts to the acquiescence to what it considers a theft—
something that not only runs counter to its own logic of persistence, but might even be 
understood within a framework of representative democracy as outright state failure. The 
result is a return to the logic of forceful coercion: either the state is successfully able to repel 
the claim, its behavior is determined by the reaction it fears in the international community 
and a credible threat of intervention, or it experiences a loss of control due to a violent 
challenge by the claimants themselves.  
 
Then, the question to ask is: what kind of work is actually being done by the principle of self-
determination under the dominant logic of governance? In most modern cases, self-
government via representational democracy is perfectly easy to rectify with the state system, 
so long as it is predicated on the idea of some past, pre-political moment of self-
determination. It is also possible to imagine situations in which states do not effectively 
discharge their duties and lose their normative mandate. But accepting the hierarchical logic 
of the state system, do we humans really have a right to define the boundaries of our political 
self and claim sovereign ownership of what is currently controlled by another sovereign entity 
when it does not wish us to do so? Do we have a right to this normative determination, 
peacefully claimed in relation to, and adjudicated by, the hierarchical state system, or must a 
violent conflict, and thus historically contingent relations of force, determine our political 
present and future?  
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3 Rhizomatic Political Self-Determination 
 
We have a choice. On the one hand, having identified the tension between sovereignty and 
self-determination at the root of the state system, we can simply choose to acknowledge this 
situation as a fait accompli—an implacable fact of life in today‘s political system. Selecting 
this option would allow us to remain in the realm of international law and the state system, 
searching for what might be useful for governments and international organizations to 
implement, civil society to advocate, and political movements to espouse as universal. This is, 
in some ways, a more outwardly attractive option, albeit one that many able and qualified 
scholars have chosen and used to cover great intellectual ground. Alternatively, we can use 
the recognition of this seemingly unresolvable tension as an opportunity to consider another 
ontology altogether—one that leaves behind the logical confines of the contractual state 
system and explores other ideas about what political self-determination can possibly mean. 
 
In this section, I will make a leap to the latter. In doing so, I will not attempt to reconcile the 
ontology of statehood and the international system with the one that I explore in this section—
in many ways, they are carefully constructed to avoid one other. Instead, I simply hope to 
facilitate a useful encounter between two concepts of political self-determination that perhaps 
can never be fully synthesized, but are rarely considered together within the scope of one line 
of argumentation.  
 
In Part 2, I argued that, despite its role at the very heart of the state system, political self-
determination remains mired in deep tension with sovereignty, and when understood in the 
present or future sense, its normative role reduces to the determinism of the constituted 
structures of force inside the hierarchical and enduring order. Claims are either understood 
based on their position relative to the interests of extant states, or by the effectiveness of the 
violence they are able to exert against a state. So, now, the first order of business is to relax 
the assumption that this is the only way to understand political self-determination and thereby 
remove its necessary tension with the notion of state sovereignty.  
 
In this part, I will consider what this notion might mean if not merely understood by its 
particular definition relative to the state formation. To do so, I will reference the corpus of 
several thinkers who share similar ontological foundations and influences in order to identify 
some coordinates of this conception of political self-determination. First, I will explore a 
concept in the work of Antonio Negri (1992/1999), who argues that revolutionary 
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(constituent) power is ‗desiccated‘ by the state system, a contractual order of fixed 
(constituted) power, in order to maintain its legitimacy. I will establish the linkage between 
this idea and what I discussed in different terms in Part 2 as the relationship between self-
determination as an imagined past action and its dramatically different position when 
considered as a present or future action of similar political magnitude.  
 
From there, I will propose the terminology of ―rhizomatic‖ self-determination as shorthand 
for thinking about political self-determination in a context apart from the state system, 
discussing how the inherently multiple and open nature of this notion can be usefully 
compared to the idea of the ‗rhizome‘ as articulated by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
(1980/1987). I will then consider Negri‘s reading (1981/1991) of the earlier ideas of Baruch 
Spinoza in order to identify an ontologically useful understanding of the ‗passions‘ animating 
human political behavior as creative and open, rather than constraining and punitive, which I 
will then use to argue that self-determination can be understood as constitutive acts leading to 
a constellation of endlessly possible political realities. I will then consider the issue of 
identifying the ‗actor‘ in political self-determination, referencing argumentation from Jacques 
Rancière (1997/2010, 2005/2006) about how the collectivity (―self‖) in self-determination can 
be created as a result of the same act that constitutes the new political reality.  
 
I will then consider two challenges of applying this largely metaphysical discussion to the 
material plane in preparation for the consideration of several case studies in Part 4: a temporal 
challenge and an epistemological one. I will thus conclude by arguing that it will be necessary 
to identify ―recent‖ acts of rhizomatic political self-determination that have created vectors of 
possibility that have not yet been terminated, and that it will be of the utmost importance to 
consider both the meanings of these moments as ascribed by their actors, as well as the nature 
of their claims relative today‘s dominant logic of governance without assuming a necessary 
binary opposition or synthesis.  
 
Departing the closed logic of the state, some ideas might become clearer. For example, it 
might become easier to recognize the particularity of the system and the functionality of the 
opposition between sovereignty and self-determination when standing outside an ontology 
that treats the unit of analysis as the supreme legitimating authority. However, it may also 
make defining the coordinates of any one concept more difficult: what is self-determination if 
not the creation of new bounded, sovereign entities? What is politics if not the public function 
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of the contractual order? This section will consider this type of questioning, and propose a 
constellation of ideas that approximate how we might imagine political self-determination 
when its meaning is decoupled from sovereignty. 
 
3.1 ‘ esiccating’  elf-Determination 
 
In Insurgencies, Negri establishes an opposition between the type of potere (―power‖ in 
Maurizia Boscagli‘s 1999 English translation) exerted by a closed constitutional order and 
that of potenza (―strength‖), which represents limitless revolutionary potential. He 
understands the former as what comprises a ―constituted‖ order of power (that which has been 
accumulated and contractualized) and the latter as ―constituent‖ power, which is the 
revolutionary expression of potenza and the true essence of democracy. He gestures to French 
political scientist Emile Boutmy, who in 1888, identified constituent power as ―rising from 
nowhere and organizing the hierarchy of powers‖ (Boutmy, 1888/1891, p. 250). If this 
mysterious constituent power comprises the original basis of the constitutional order, an 
original expression of potenza, then that must mean “a power from nowhere organizes law‖ 
(Negri, 1992/1999, p. 2). This, he argues, represents a ―crisis,‖ because the boundless 
normative power of potenza must, at once, be the foundation of the constituted order, but also 
simultaneously constrained and subjugated to potere if a representational system is to survive. 
He writes: 
  
To accept this crisis means, first of all, to refuse the notion that the concept of constituent 
power may somehow be founded by something else—taken away, that is, from its own nature 
as a foundation. This attempt surfaces, as we have seen, whenever constituent power is 
subordinated to representation or to the principle of sovereignty, but it already starts operating 
when the omnipotence and expansiveness of constituent power are limited or made subject to 
constitutionalist aims. Constituent power, they say and decree, can only be defined as 
extraordinary (in time) and it can only be fixed (in space) by a singular determination: it is 
considered either as a normative fact that is deemed preexistent or as a material constitution 
that develops in tandem with it! But this is all absurd: how can a normative fact validated by 
custom do justice to innovation? (Negri, 1992/1999, p. 13) 
 
At the heart of constitutional logic, Negri says, is a contradiction. Though this contradiction is 
not resolved within the system per se, the mechanics of its operation are clear. Sovereignty 
and constituted power are privileged and free, and constituent power is kept alive, artificially 
bounded and trapped behind glass. It is treated with reverence and fear, and its imprisonment 
imagined as consensual. He writes: 
 
Constituent power, limited and finalized in such a way, is thus held back within the 
hierarchical routines of successive production and representation, and conceptually 
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reconstructed not as the system‘s cause, but as its result. The foundation is inverted, and 
sovereignty as suprema potestas is reconstructed as the foundation itself. But it is a foundation 
contrary to constituent power; it is a summit, whereas constituent power is a basis. It is an 
accomplished finality, whereas constituent power is unfinalized; it implies limited time and 
space, whereas constituent power implies a multidirectional plurality of times and spaces; it is 
a rigidified formal constituent, whereas constituent power is absolute process. Everything, in 
sum, sets constituent power and sovereignty in opposition, even the absolute character that 
both categories lay claim to: the absoluteness of sovereignty is a totalitarian concept, whereas 
that of constituent power is the absoluteness of democratic government (Negri, 1992/1999, p. 
13). 
 
In this arrangement, constituent power has become ―subjectively desiccated,‖ wherein the 
―singular characteristics of its originary and inalienable nature vanish,‖ its revolutionary 
potential has been stifled, and it has been ―situated within the concept of the nation‖ (Negri, 
1992/1999, p. 3). Though it might merely be treated as a creation myth of the history of the 
nation and the state formation, it must be kept alive and on view if the constitutional order is 
to continue its operation, because ―its elimination might nullify the very meaning of the 
juridical system and the democratic relation that must characterize its horizon‖ (Negri, 
1992/1999, p. 4). Lastly, it is encased in ―the rules of assembly,‖ a particular rationality of 
governance, and the logical link is established between suffrage and the ―originary, 
commissionary‖ constituent power, which now lives behind glass and is thus harvested of its 
power through representative mechanisms (Ibid.).  
 
By now, the parallels of this argument and what I explored in Section 2 might seem apparent. 
For, even viewed from within the logic of the state system, it is necessary to create strict 
definitional limits to political self-determination: it must, for example, occur as the result of 
state misbehavior, it must manifest as ethno-national consciousness, it must be constituted by 
territorially-delimited plebiscite, and so on. But, in the vast majority of cases, it must have 
occurred at an earlier point in time to be considered legitimate now. What Negri understands 
as ―desiccation‖–temporal limitation, destruction of revolutionary potential, and entrapment 
inside a particular narrative of state formation–is obviously at work here too.  
 
Indeed, this frame is of extreme importance to understand why, if sovereignty and self-
determination cannot be fully synthesized, how they continue to operate in concert. Negri‘s 
answer is shockingly similar to the theorists we considered in the previous section: ―the 
antagonistic event disappears‖ (Negri, 1992/1999, p. 18). For, even erudite scholars of 
democratic theory and international law see a point at which the state system‘s legitimation 
rests on myth and arbitrary historical contingency, and the necessary opposition of the closed, 
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constituted power of the state system and the boundless horizons of constituent power must 
simply be ignored. This is what brings us to the choice we faced at the beginning of this 
section. If, as Nietzsche infamously asserts, ―truths are illusions which one has forgotten [are 
illusions],‖ then perhaps acceptance of this arrangement is not an egregious, or even unusual, 
prospect (Nietzsche, 1873/1999, p. 146). But, if we are to make an attempt to understand what 
might be possible beyond the horizons of the particular logic of governance that exists today, 
it is clearly important to acknowledge the ―crisis‖ of desiccation.  
 
At this point, from the perspective of their common fate inside the constitutional system, I 
have mostly treated the concepts of political self-determination from Section 2 and constituent 
power from Negri‘s argument as one and the same. To a great extent, this equation makes 
sense. However, I should make an important etymological distinction. Crucially, ―self-
determination‖ implies an act, or at least a set of actions, and so it is perhaps best understood 
within the terms of this argument as an expression of constituent power. This means that, 
instead of being a mysterious, irreducible force as Negri imagines constituent power, we can 
positively explore a few contours of how political self-determination might manifest. We need 
not merely rely on historical instances of revolution to view our subject, as Negri mostly does, 
but we can also turn to a cognitively and socially creative concept that, freed of its particular 
sustaining relationship to the Western invention of the state, can be taken to mean something 
other than legitimation of a previously constituted order.  
 
3.2 Self- etermination as a ‘Rhizomatic’ Idea 
 
―Self-determination,‖ Marc Weller writes from the perspective of international law, is ―a 
concept with multiple meanings‖ (Weller, 2008, p. 23). If this is true from within the 
particular and hierarchical state order, then this problem must be infinitely multiplied when 
understood outside it. This is because, without constraint or limitation, ‗self-determination‘ is 
a fundamentally creative and open idea, and without encasement inside a particular definition 
of governance, the nature of the ‗political‘ is also in contention. Indeed, if we accept that 
political self-determination can be understood as an expression of constituent power, then its 
meaning derives from what Negri calls a ―multidirectional plurality of times and spaces‖ 
(Negri, 1992/1999, p. 13). When we remove the bumpers of the very particular state system, 
how can we even understand what that entails, much less distinguish it from its ‗desiccated‘ 
form?  
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One useful concept can be found by turning to Negri‘s ontological compatriots Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari, who explored a notion of ‗the multiple‘ that is clearly related to the 
‗multidirectional plurality‘ Negri identifies. They write: 
 
The multiple must be made, not by always adding a higher dimension, but rather in the 
simplest of ways, by dint of sobriety, with the number of dimensions one already has 
available—always n-1 (the only way the one belongs to the multiple: always subtracted). 
Subtract the unique from the multiplicity to be constituted; write at n-1 dimensions (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 6). 
 
The multiple is, as such, a total plurality. It is that which exists at all times, in all spaces, in all 
possibilities. It is not, they argue, a synthesis of all particularities and all realities; those 
particularities are simply subtracted from the multiple, and as such, the multiple is comprised 
partially of all things, but all things are not its totality. The radicality of constituent power, as 
also imagined in this way, is in its revolutionary derivation from totality and infinite 
possibility.  
 
This idea is extremely useful for our purposes. Political self-determination, without the 
entrapment of a particular constituted order, is something that appears as an expression of 
total creativity. And, if we are attempting to identify the manifestations of something this 
limitless, an expression of a constituent power that derives from the multiple, we need to 
simultaneously consider its radical plurality alongside the particularity of what we are 
attempting to investigate. The concept of n-1 helps envision this operation.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari write that ―a system of this kind could be called a rhizome‖ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 6). The image of the rhizome distinguishes it from a system of 
―arborescence,‖ which imagines the world as a tree and its roots, in which there is ―One that 
becomes two, then of the two that becomes four‖ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 5). 
The arborescent mode of thought envisions a singular starting point, from which all things 
derive hierarchically, in constant bifurcation from one another. As such, ―binary logic is the 
spiritual reality of the root-tree, and thus, ―this is as much to say that this system of thought 
has never reached an understanding of multiplicity: in order to arrive at the two following a 
spiritual method it must assume a strong principal unity‖ (Ibid.). A rhizome, on the other 
hand, is based on the image of a ―subterranean stem [that] is absolutely difficult from roots 
and radicles‖ because of its ability to grow in any direction and form multiple connections 
with any other parts of the plant (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 6). Instead of assuming 
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bifurcation and linear progression from a singular unitary point, a rhizomatic system can 
move in any direction, with any magnitude, and form connections to anything.    
 
As such, when the multiple is ―effectively treated as a substantive,‖ and understood as a 
rhizomatic system, it can be thought of as a multiplicity (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 
8). They explain:  
 
Multiplicities are rhizomatic, and expose arborescent pseudomultiplicities for what they are. 
There is no unity to serve as the pivot in the object, or to divide in the subject. There is not 
even the unity to abort in the object or ―return‖ in the subject. A multiplicity has neither 
subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in 
number without the multiplicity changing in nature (the laws of combination therefore 
increase in number as the multiplicity grows) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 8). 
 
To investigate political self-determination beyond its desiccated state, it appears that we can 
accept some of the abstractions of the multiple, and in conferring substantiality, conceive of it 
as a rhizomatic multiplicity. From its position in the state system, part of a unitary whole, it 
has a clear foundational role of logical, representational legitimation. But when imagined 
beyond a particular binary, hierarchical, and ―arborescent‖ system, the nature of its 
multiplicity is clear: what it can be and what kind of relationships it can create depend on how 
it is subtracted from the multiple by those who are self-determining. We avoid the trap of 
determinism by eschewing the logic of universal derivation from the One. 
 
In proposing that we conceive of political self-determination that has been decoupled from the 
sovereign state system as rhizomatic, I also propose that we refer to it as such. But why not 
simply call this idea ‗alternative‘ political self-determination? I contend that, while 
‗alternative‘ may be a useful shorthand to think about particular manifestations of self-
determination beyond the state, it is also deferential to that which is not alternative, or in other 
words, that which is ‗standard.‘ We risk, then, buying the arborescent logic of binary 
opposition in understanding how political self-determination must manifest. In doing so, we 
understand it as necessarily different from the passions that drive the operations of the state 
system, which is the natural standard, and so we are obligated to propose something better—a 
―superior alternative,‖ so to speak. But we need not think of the symbologies and slogans of 
our particular history and the ghosts of past oppositions to imagine possible expressions of 
constituent power. In short, imagining political self-determination as rhizomatic gives us the 
space to explore what is and might be, rather than what has been.  
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3.3 Determining the Political   
 
Now, we confront the problem of defining the ‗bounds‘ of self-determination. For, if it is 
subtracted from a multiplicity—with infinite possible forms and manifestations—how can we 
understand how it would manifest in a way that we are able to recognize as ‗political‘? We 
are, thus, faced with the challenge of how not to simply construe rhizomatic political self-
determination as some kind of mirror opposite of its desiccated form. We risk falling into the 
trap of solely recognizing collective action that mimics the dominant logic of governance: a 
constituted, hierarchical structure that challenges one of the particular elements of the modern 
state system, and as such, becomes our coordinates for imagining rhizomatic self-
determination. Negri cautions: 
 
…any philosophy that even heroically has an institutionalist outcome must be refused if we 
want to grasp the strength of the constituent principle. This is because in the constitutive act 
there is never any vertical and totalitarian dimension. The active elements are, rather, 
resistance and desire, an ethical impulse and a constructive passion, an articulation of the 
sense of the insufficiency of existence and a deeply vigorous reaction to an unbearable 
absence of being (Negri, 1992/1999, p. 23). 
 
The challenge lies, as such, in imagining self-determination (‗the constitutive act‘) in a way 
that does not map to a vertical or hierarchical structure that regulates behavior and preserves 
the implication of total possibility that renders its essence rhizomatic. Perhaps the first layer 
of this question can be deferred without a great deal of trouble: the subtraction of ‗self-
determination‘ from the multiple implies the particular construction of the 1. And, because we 
are vesting an actor (the ‗self‘) with that operation, we are absolved of having to fix its 
meaning as absolute. Each ‗self‘ that ‗determines‘ creates both the particularity and the 
meaning of its own action.  
 
Yet, even if this is the case, failing to imagine how this can occur effectively robs the idea of 
any ontological specificity. In this way, any action could be imagined as determination; any 
self could be imagined as determining, regardless of their extant relationships to other selves 
or other particularities. So, we must still further consider a way to conceive of both the 
boundless and creative nature of self-determination (thereby expanding it beyond a defining 
relationship with the state system), while still searching for its coordinates as a particular way 
to understand its manifestation relative to that which we understand as political. This can be 
done, as Negri implies above, by accepting the possibility that the political can be a creative 
force, which rushes in to fill absence, rather than something that must be established as a 
 35 
constraint to punish or regulate behavior. This is, perhaps, what runs most counter to the 
contractual narrative of the state system, which holds that humans recognize their community 
as requiring protection from both within and without, and thereby engage in politics to limit 
the scope of their own ―natural‖ behavior. But, to imagine the power of rhizomatic self-
determination, we can start by not simply thinking of the political as that which is animated 
by contract and constraint, but also imagining it as that which can be animated by spontaneity 
and joy.  
 
In his reading of Baruch Spinoza (1981/1991), Negri explores this idea. He begins by probing 
the horizon of the infinite and the spontaneous creativity of the particular:  
 
Determining existence as totality means conceiving its infinity, a determinate and positive 
infinity, which is precisely the totality. On a higher ontological level, but in complete 
coherence with the premises, existence is the spontaneity of being considered as totality. The 
existential nexuses conclude in this totality, in the infinite series of relationships that it 
determines, in the absolute thing, or substance. This enclosure of existence in the infinite is 
not a process, it is a production of the infinite itself in its positive essence (Negri, 1981/1991, 
p. 45). 
 
This sets the stage for Spinoza‘s engagement with the plane of the material, which Negri 
argues, understands reality as a particular expression, but one with a relationship to a horizon 
of potentiality. Spinoza rejects the dominant theology of the divine, instead viewing the divine 
as ―a total horizon that does not recognize even a logical transcendence‖ (Negri, 1981/1991, 
p. 127). As such, the divine is ―the complex of potential force‖ (Ibid.). Instead of a single, 
representative figure, the divine is the multiple, and the material is simply what is subtracted 
from it, becoming the particular.  
 
Thus, while we cannot precisely define the ‗alternative,‘ some singular nature of that which 
exists beyond what has already been determined on the material plane, we can create a form 
of it. This is, in Negri‘s interpretation, enabled by the nature of Spinoza‘s vision of the 
political. Though it speaks in terms of what is ‗naturally‘ possible, and in some senses 
determined by human passions, Negri argues that it is situated far from the framework of 
‗natural right‘ thinkers who see the necessity of constraining the ‗natural‘ violence of humans 
by a sovereign arbiter. Instead, humans can effectively determine a new reality, created from 
what was before only a potential characteristic of the multiple:  
 
Spinoza's specific formulation evades and rejects what seem to be the fundamental 
characteristics of natural-right philosophies: the absolute conception of the individual 
foundation and the absolute conception of the contractual passage. And opposed to these 
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absolute fundamentals, Spinozian thought proposes a physics of society: in other words, a 
mechanics of individual pressures and a dynamics of associative relationships, which 
characteristically are never closed in the absolute but, rather, proceed by ontological 
dislocations. The great difficulty of situating Spinoza's position among the various theories of 
natural right, a problem that is well-known to philosophical historiography, can be explained 
by one single fact: Spinoza's social, juridical and political thought does not adhere to the 
doctrine of natural right. Whereas natural-right thought, in its foundation, is an analytic of the 
passions, Spinoza's thought is a phenomenology of the passions; whereas natural-right 
thought, in the theory of the contract and absolutism, is animated by a dialectical pressure, 
Spinoza's thought is open to a constitutive problematic (Negri, 1981/1991, pp. 109–110).  
 
As such, this ‗constitutive problematic‘ remains open to the infinite logical horizon of the 
multiple, rather than that which is already a reality. In Spinoza‘s political logic, Negri 
recognizes that ―the passage from individuality to community does not come about either 
through a transfer of power or through a cession of rights; rather, it comes about within a 
constitutive process of the imagination that knows no logical interruption‖ (Negri, 1981/1991, 
p. 110). This endless constitutive imagination manifests in acts that mine the particular from 
the multiple—this sense of the political moves to the plane of material precisely as it is 
determined. Collective passions are the animus, and those can be passions of joy and 
spontaneity rather than antagonism and constraint. The political cannot be predicted or 
understood as a theologically divine truth; it is simply what is real because it is made so.   
 
When we imagine rhizomatic self-determination as the process of subtracting a political 
reality from the multiple, the weight of this interpretation becomes clear. The state and state 
system are part of a particular reality with its own logic of legitimation, which has been 
subtracted out of this plurality. But the rhizomatic idea requires no legitimation of supposedly 
universal principles of natural, binary antagonism. ‗Natural‘ law, as Negri interprets Spinoza, 
is what can be determined as natural, and it can be determined as such because we can 
imagine it. In this reading, rhizomatic self-determination happens not just when a particular 
state or governance order is created—it is nothing less than our act of creating a nature of the 
political.  
 
3.4 Determining the Self    
 
We now must address the question of subjective agency: who is the self in this rhizomatic 
notion of self-determination? For, even Negri seems to understand politics as a necessary 
transition from individual to collective and confronts the fundamental challenge of defining a 
collective ‗self‘ beyond that which is purely individual. To avoid relying on any sort of ‗pre-
political‘ logic of human community or fixed boundedness to establish this collectivity, the 
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political self might then be imagined as a spontaneous construction of human desire and 
will—founded in mutual aid and collaboration, rather than as some natural act of exclusion. 
Here, once again, it is helpful to reference Negri‘s reading of Spinoza to conceive of this shift:  
 
Man, we have seen, is not ―a State within a State.‖ Nature is not a State, confederated and 
confused in its constitution… it is instead a collective entity or, rather, a process that sees the 
human individuality construct itself as a collective entity… The materialistic determination of 
the constitutive process is, in fact, characterized by this additional modality: the collective, the 
multitude (Negri, 1981/1991, p. 135).  
 
With this framing, it is possible to imagine a political self constituted not by way of ceding 
individual agency to a ―transcendental mediator,‖ but as a unity of will and a recognition of 
the collective multitude as a function of human desires (Negri, 1981/1991, p. 135). After all, 
―the concept of collectivity is nothing other than an ontological determination of the 
relationship between multiplicity and unity,‖ which melts down the definitional boundaries of 
individuality and collectivity to functions of the same constitutive process of human creativity 
(Negri, 1981/1991, pp. 135–136). The boundaries of the self are thus irrelevant (or at least 
entirely permeable), and as a result, the logics of communitarian exclusion also disappear.  
 
But, if it has no fixed delimitation, how does the self become a subject? Jacques Rancière 
(1997/2010) imagines the emergence of the political as the rupture of the dominant logic of 
ordering, which creates a ―subject defined by its participation in contrarieties‖ (p. 29). 
Effectively, it is in the exercise of collective agency that the self is constituted. When 
Rancière (2005/2006) makes the equation between an exercise of this type of agency with the 
notion of ‗democracy,‘ it manifests in the disruption of that is considered the ‗natural‘ 
political logic of governance and assembly. He writes: 
 
Democratic excess does not have anything to do with a supposed consumptive madness. It is 
simply the dissolving of any standard by which nature could give its law to communitarian 
artifice via the relations of authority that structure the social body. The scandal lies in the 
disjoining of entitlements to govern from any analogy to those that order social relations, from 
any analogy between human convention and the order of nature. It is the scandal of a 
superiority based on no other title than the very absence of superiority (Rancière, 2005/2006, 
p. 41).  
 
Rancière imagines this moment of creation at the point of departure from the logic of arkhè –
the philosophy of governance by ‗natural right,‘ and the disruption of dominance of those 
considered ―appropriate for the role‖ (Rancière, 2005/2006, p. 39). There has been no pre-
defined reason or legitimation for this disruption; it simply occurs as a function of collective 
will. He sets up this opposition in terms of the emergence of la politique, which counters the 
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dominant logic of la police. In the terms we discussed before, this could be said to occur at 
the moment when a new reality is subtracted from the multiple—a moment of self-
determination. Thus, Rancière imagines that this moment, in addition to constituting the new 
‗politics,‘ also creates the subject-self:  
 
Politics cannot be defined on the basis of any pre-existing subject. The political ‗difference‘ 
that makes it possible to think its subject must be sought in the form of its relation… If there is 
something ‗proper‘ to politics, it consists entirely in this relationship which is not a 
relationship between subjects, but one between two contradictory terms through which a 
subject is defined. Politics disappears the moment you undo this knot of a subject and a 
relation. This is what happens in all fictions, be they speculative or empiricist, that seek the 
origin of the political relationship in the properties of its subjects and in the conditions of their 
coming together. The traditional question "For what reasons do human beings gather into 
political communities?" is always already a response, and one that causes the disappearance of 
the object it claims to explain or to ground –i.e., the form of a political part-taking that then 
disappears in the play of elements or atoms of sociability (Rancière, 1997/2010, p. 28-29).  
 
The radically creative essence of rhizomatic political self-determination is, as such, present on 
both sides of the hyphen. We need not search for a bounded community that has defined its 
limits to confer subjectivity. We also do not need to search for a single, individual ‗self‘ or 
many ‗selves‘ transferring agency to a constructed collective. The problem is solved by the 
unlimited potentiality of the idea—the simple but radical notion that, in the creative act of 
determining its political reality, the collective also determines itself.  
 
3.5 The Temporal Challenge  
 
We now have an ontology that specifies the particularity of rhizomatic self-determination, but 
preserves its radical potentiality by understanding the act itself as constitutive of both the 
entire political reality and the political subject. If we now wish to move this argument from 
the domain of metaphysics to that of the material, we are faced with two major challenges: 
one temporal and one epistemic. In this section, I will address the first one. 
 
The temporal challenge is thus: how are we to identify material instances of rhizomatic 
political self-determination when we have established its definition as endlessly multiple? 
Negri solves this problem in his investigation of constituent power by analyzing historical 
episodes and situating their creativity in the context of the history of the juridical state system. 
The contours of constitutive power and resulting acts of self-determination thus become 
visible when viewed next to the dominant logics of their time. As such, the revolutionary 
potential and outcomes of contingency are much easier to understand because they have 
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already reached their conclusion. But by definition, they have bearing on the particular reality 
we live in now because of the particular outcome of present political logics—most obviously, 
the robust persistence of the state system. However, situated within a perspective of 
contemporaneous historical reality, these acts of self-determination can be understood as 
radical ruptures in governance logic and be recognized as constitutive of previously 
unrealized political possibilities. As Negri himself puts it, when constituent power is 
recognized in history, it is ―the supreme principle of a becoming that has its roots in the past, 
in the necessary preconditions of what exist; in the past it is seen producing the present‖ 
(Negri, 1992/1999, p. 232).  
 
We might, however, perform a similar operation with regard to cases of the present. (Though, 
of course, we must allow for some lag, and call these ―recent‖ acts of political self-
determination, rather than ―present‖ ones). In this regard, we even have the advantage of open 
potentiality—some acts of collective self-determination in the recent past have unleashed 
vectors of possibility that have not yet concluded in encasement within state logic or in its 
disruption. It is at this critical moment that we might be able to consider the implications of 
collective actions that have happened, but whose direct effects have not ended.  
 
What about the future? This is one temporal direction that I argue we should not follow. A 
single predictive discussion of how future self-determination is likely to (or should) occur 
would be a solely individual exercise, and one that would be stumble upon the tangles of 
multiplicity. To avoid the traps of determinism we discussed before, prediction should be 
avoided: in order to expect some outcome, we must be able to extend the logic of its 
progression. But this is the very logic that we imagine being ruptured by an act of self-
determination—encasing the future in the particularity of the present.  
 
This does, however, raise a question: must all emergences of constitutive power end in a 
particular way? In other words, does an act of self-determination either end in repression, or 
result in the establishment of a new political reality and logic, which then in turn, becomes 
mired in the same problems of constitution, hierarchy, and domination? Does, in the language 
of Rancière, what was once la politique always become la police? Negri recognizes this 
problem as one of time, and argues that it can be ―… grounded in human productive capacity, 
in the ontology of its becoming—an open, absolutely constitutive temporality that does not 
disclose Being but instead produces beings‖ (Negri, 1992/1999, p. 30). This ―open‖ time is 
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the key to avoiding the problem of the ‗Thermidor,‘ a revolutionary cooling, because ―it is the 
time of labor that liberates itself; or it is the time of property that is confirmed, open time or 
consolidated time‖ (Negri, 1992/1999, p. 231). In short, when time becomes the consolidated 
property of a particular order, then it becomes constrained.  
 
In Empire, Negri‘s third collaboration with Michael Hardt (2009), the authors imagine a 
means of sustaining the revolutionary nature of democracy contra the current state and 
capitalist order. In this way, they address ―the transition,‖ or what occurs after the 
revolutionary, ―insurrectional event‖ (p. 361). In their view, revolution is ―not just an event of 
destruction but also a long and sustained process of transformation, creating a new humanity‖ 
(Ibid.). In this regard, they argue that the collectivity created by the act of self-determination 
is maintained not through some encasement in contractual and hierarchical logic, but in a 
sustained process of innovation. This is maintained by an ―institutional and constitutional 
will,‖ which in turn, comprises ―a powerful and lasting common process‖ (Hardt and Negri, 
2009, p. 375). This results in structures of ―governance‖ rather than ―government,‖ which 
entails a ―move from a unitary and deductive normative structure to a pluralistic and plastic 
one‖ (Hardt and Negri, 2009, p. 373). They imagine, as such, the possibility of sustaining the 
collective will through common creation, rather than on the basis of any closed order. So, 
while this derives from an argument about a particular inversion of our particular dominant 
logic of governance, there is an argument here to understand the ontologically open 
possibility of constituent power: as long as it can be exercised as a function of collective will 
and not of contract, it is sustained.  
 
3.6 The Epistemological Challenge  
 
Now, before moving on to consider ―recent‖ acts of rhizomatic self-determination, we must 
confront the second challenge—one of epistemology. Namely, how are we to imagine acts 
that create new logics and knowledges when relying on an academic understanding born of a 
particular European tradition? For, despite its rejection of transcendental and universal reality, 
the ontology we have just explored was largely authored by European thinkers and was 
shaped by the particular experiences of Western history and society. Much of it is presented in 
binary opposition to the particularly European construction of the state system. Our relying 
solely on the epistemic extensions of this ontology in material cases poses the risk of 
constraining us, once again, to a simple mirror-image critique of a particular set of political 
logics.  
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Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014) writes in Epistemologies of the South that a meaningful 
critical theory can only be constructed by looking for voices beyond Western epistemic 
structures. He prefaces the book with three main arguments: 
 
First, the understanding of the world by far exceeds the Western understanding of the world. 
Second, there is no global social justice without global cognitive justice. Third, the 
emancipatory transformations in the world may follow grammars and scripts other than those 
developed by Western-centric critical theory, and such diversity should be valorized (Sousa 
Santos, 2014, p. 8).  
 
This argument challenges us to seek instances of self-determination and ‗emancipatory 
transformations‘ that may not appear, at first, to even materially resemble the historical 
experiences of European society. If we are to avoid becoming entrapped by a perspective that, 
at once, eschews universalism, but still seeks particular patterns of behavior that are largely 
colored by a particular historical experience, we must attempt to better understand what might 
exist outside the Western epistemological structure. In essence, this amounts to seeking 
encounter with that which might challenge the state system in some sense, but may not direct 
its collective will toward lodging particular claims situated inside its logic. 
 
Sousa Santos (2007) argues that the dominant Western model of science has ―systematically 
distrusted the evidence of our immediate experience,‖ instead viewing nature solely as a 
―mechanism whose elements can be disassembled and then put back together again in the 
form of laws‖ (p. 17). The dominant epistemology, which grew to become virtually 
unchallenged in Western society, distrusted experiences that could not be codified within the 
specific boundaries of this rationality. He writes that, as a result of this:  
  
…all that was arbitrarily conceived of as being outside this highly intellectualized and 
rationalized field was ignored or stigmatized. Outside was the dark world of passions, 
intuitions, feelings, emotions, affections, beliefs, faiths, values, myths, and the world of the 
unsayable, which cannot be communicated save indirectly, as Kierkegaard would say. Various 
kinds of positivism managed to demonstrate that what was left out either did not exist (was an 
illusion) or was unimportant or dangerous. Such reductionisms allowed for geometrical 
correspondences between theory and practice. However, as both theory and practice became 
disembodied from their unsayable ―halves,‖ it became impossible to account for the 
complexity and contingency of the relationships between them (Sousa Santos, 2014, p. 20).  
 
This is the reason, he argues, to search for episodes of collectivity that challenge dominant 
political logic (largely conceived and promulgated in the ‗Global North‘) in ideas coming 
from ‗the Global South.‘ These are not so much geographic distinctions as they are 
acknowledgements of the systemic and epistemic immanence of Western thinkers and ideas 
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within the particular history of European domination that has resulted in the production and 
reproduction of today‘s prevailing political logics (Sousa Santos, 2014, pp. 26–28). This is 
particularly true of a scientific logic that asserts universalism, and requires its intellectuals to 
pretend to a subjective distance from the ‗natural reality.‘ As such, Sousa Santos (2010) 
demonstrates that, for example, in formulating a challenge to the capitalist system, indigenous 
movements may have more expansive political imagination than Western thinker—for, what 
might be necessarily conceived as ―post-capitalist‖ by a Western rational epistemology might 
well be understood as part of a ―pre-capitalist‖ political reality by indigenous movements, or 
something with no relationship to the capitalist form whatsoever (p. 27).  
 
We cannot pretend to wholly overcome this challenge while working inside a Western system 
of language and academic exchange. Yet, it is crucial to keep this limitation in mind, and to 
the extent possible, to understand the material investigation of rhizomatic self-determination 
as one of ―encounter‖ rather than one of definitive ―explanation.‖ Eduardo Viveiros de Castro 
(2010/2014) illuminates some of this challenge relative to the anthropological discipline in his 
Cannibal Metaphysics. Here, he acknowledges the problem that Sousa Santos calls the 
―protagonism of intellectuals‖ as an immanent issue of the discipline: the systemic 
recognition of the debates and contexts of the investigators as universal while the so-called 
‗subject‘ is sapped of intellectual productivity (Sousa Santos, 2015, p. 26). He challenges:  
 
Couldn‘t one shift to a perspective showing that the source of the most interesting concepts, 
problems, entities, and agents introduced into thought by anthropological theory is in the 
imaginative powers of the societies—or, better, the peoples and collectives—that they propose 
to explain? Doesn‘t the originality of anthropological theory instead reside there, in this 
always-equivocal but always fecund alliance between the conceptions and practices that arise 
form the worlds of the so-called ―subject‖ and ―object‖ of anthropology? (Viveiros de Castro, 
2010/2014, p. 40) 
 
He imagines this project as ―the decolonization of thought,‖ which looks to acknowledge the 
productive co-creation in the moment of encounter, rather than the assignment of Western 
coordinates of meaning (Ibid.). This seems like a simple proposition, but has the effect of 
radically reconfiguring particular epistemological boundaries of what is universally ―natural‖ 
and what is relatively ―cultural,‖ or at least rendering their meanings contingent. Viveiros de 
Castro demonstrates one example:  
 
…virtually all peoples of the New World share a conception of the world as composed of a 
multiplicity of points of view. Every existent is a center of intentionality apprehending other 
existents according to their respective characteristics and powers. The presuppositions and 
consequences of this idea are nevertheless irreducible to the current concept of relativism that 
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they would, at first glance, seem to evoke. They are, in fact, instead arranged on a plane 
orthogonal to the opposition between relativism and universalism (Viveiros de Castro, 
2010/2014, p. 55). 
 
For the purposes of investigating material recent acts of rhizomatic self-determination, we 
face a similar dilemma to that of Viveiros de Castro‘s anthropologist. If we are looking for 
moments of creation that constitute new collectives and political realities, we must not simply 
consider formations that challenge a variety of political constitution that we understand from 
the perspective of one ―cosmo-vision‖ of epistemological particularity. We must also attempt 
to understand acts of self-determination that create logics situated far beyond the binary 
oppositions of the Western state system. 
 
3.7 Approaching the Material  
 
Our discussion of temporality and epistemology leaves us with some useful guidance. 
Chiefly, we clearly should not seek to identify an objective case of ―perfectly‖ rhizomatic 
political self-determination. By fixing the criteria of this category, we would encase what we 
seek to understand within the suffocating limitations of our own logic. We would valorize 
something that is simply a subtraction from the multiple as a universal truth, entrapping its 
creative nature in our explanatory one. In this vein, we should also avoid predicting the future, 
for fear of ignoring the constitutive and contingent power of new epistemologies and political 
realities that will arise from collective will, rather than from the extant logics we can extend.  
 
But it is also clear that we should not abandon the constraints of our particular logic—doing 
so would render the project of working from a Western academic perspective completely 
meaningless. Instead, we should seek an explanation of the projects of self-determination we 
investigate from the voices of those who are participating, and instead of translating these 
ideas to a context of binary opposition with the dominant governance logic of the state 
system, perhaps situate them in a context we understand. This means seeking to understand 
how they relate to the state system without simply assuming that their political logic is in 
direct synthesis or opposition with it. In fact, each of the four cases I will consider in Part 4 
entail wildly divergent claims relative to the state system—our task is merely to recognize 
their particularity. Perhaps, in this way, we should draw inspiration from Spinoza himself in 
the goals of our investigation: seek out what is ―Non opposita sed diversa‖ (―not opposed but 
different‖). 
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4 Case Studies of Rhizomatic Self-Determination 
 
Now, we arrive at the point of considering collective political acts as moments of rhizomatic 
self-determination. In this section, I will present four recent cases of collective political 
action, endeavor to understand the challenges they pose to the state formation, and present a 
discussion about how the vectors of possibility each creates can be understood as modeling 
the ideas we explored in Part 3. The aim of this section is to approach a more material 
understanding of how certain claims of self-determination unleash new scripts of political 
possibility and subjectivity, and as such, can be understood as ‗rhizomatic‘ 
 
First, I will consider the case of Catalonia. On the surface, this case demonstrates many of the 
problems of ―classic‖ self-determination—in 2016, the Catalan parliament took action to 
claim independent statehood from the Kingdom of Spain, and as such, sought to legitimate a 
claim of secession with a referendum in 2017. In doing so, its political aims intersected 
normatively with those of leftist organizations, like the Podemos movement, that also sought 
the elimination of Spanish sovereignty in Catalonia, but did so on the basis of the state‘s 
entanglement in the global financial system it considered corrupt and exploitative. 
Considering this case first will allow us to trace the state-bound logic of Part 2 to the point 
where sovereignty and self-determination are in direct, irreducible tension and cannot be 
resolved simply within the ontological bounds of the state system. Here, it meets a 
‘transversal‘ intersection with another normative position that is situated outside of the statist 
logic, and as such, creates a new vector of political possibility that could not be possible if 
both claims to self-determination adhered to the binary structure of state legitimation. 
 
Then, I will consider the Zapatista movement, which staged a short violent uprising in the 
Mexican state of Chiapas in 1994. In considering the impact of this organization‘s project, I 
will examine how it moved from the closed logic of military antagonism to a deterritorialized 
plane where it continues to produce influential political ideas. In doing so, the Zapatistas can 
create and test ideas of communal ownership, cooperative and non-exploitative economic 
practices, and democratic autonomy without directly engaging superior forces of material 
coercion. However, because the Zapatista project exists in geographic isolation and does not 
assert sovereign claims to control territory, it can create powerful possibilities that erode the 
state‘s sole ownership of political imagination, if not formal control. 
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Next, I will consider a case where the defense of territory exposes a rhizomatic political 
project to problems of totality and institutionalization. Rojava, or the Democratic Federation 
of Northern Syria, has won decisive military victories over the Islamic State, and has 
managed to establish extensive political structures espousing ideas of radically local and 
gender equal practices of governance in an area home to over 4 million people. Though 
officially an ‗anti-systemic‘ order that does not officially aspire to statehood, warfare, internal 
divisions, and hostility from the Turkish state necessitate the establishment of certain 
functions that appear ‗state-like‘ in their capacities to maintain the territorial control of the 
entity. As such, we will be able to see a distinction between the emancipatory effects of the 
political project as a moment of rhizomatic self-determination in possible contrast to the 
material realities it confronts as it struggles to maintain a total, ‗semi-sovereign‘ control of 
territory. 
 
Lastly, I will discuss the case of indigenous movements in the South American countries of 
Bolivia and Ecuador, which successfully infused new state constitutions with a program of 
rhizomatic ideas of plurinationality. These movements highlight the ongoing effects of 
colonial domination on these societies, as well as in the prevailing logics of hierarchy and 
monoculturality present in the entire state system. This project aims not just to secure a 
formal, ‗classic‘ schedule of minority rights to culture and autonomy, but to fundamentally 
reinvent the state by altering its political form. I will show how, though within rational and 
binary logic this may first appear contradictory and even generate seemingly unfavorable 
results, its proponents see an opportunity to create a deep and abiding transformation of 
dominant political logic and epistemology that will take place over time rather than in a single 
moment of imagined contractual consent. 
 
4.1 Catalonia: Sovereign Self-Determination and Transversality 
 
Perhaps the most obvious recent act of sovereign self-determination was the October 2017 
Catalan Independence referendum. In many regards, this situation in Catalonia perfectly 
models the dimensions of the problem that we addressed in Part 2: a secessionist claim 
positing one representational political order‘s wishes against the opposing interests of one that 
exercises the sovereign powers of statehood. Indeed, in couching its claim to independence in 
the terms of a national-cultural political community dominated by an external power, the 
Catalan bid for independence from the Kingdom of Spain appears to be quite a ―classic‖ 
secessionist demand, plagued by the same logical and legal tensions that ensnare other claims 
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of self-determination that have not been validated by the existing state system. Yet, there are 
also other dimensions to this story. Alongside longstanding claims to Catalan national 
community boundedness, the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis gave momentum to leftist 
movements challenging the global capitalist system, which then began to recognize common 
cause with pro-secession groups opposing the Spanish state‘s sovereign control of Catalonia. 
In this regard, the case takes on a unique plurality of actors united in opposition of a particular 
state formation, but whose imagined political futures are very different. The nature of their 
alliance is, however, not simply strategic—their momentary normative intersection occurs at 
the point where the logic of the closed state system ends, not just where their political 
interests align. 
 
The optics of the October 2017 referendum are hard to ignore. In passing the ‗Law on the 
Referendum on Self-Determination of Catalonia‘ on October 6, 2016, the Catalan 
Parliament‘s pro-independence majority coalition positioned itself as the potential inheritor of 
the organs of statehood (Reuters, 2016). Per this law, the referendum was to be conducted on 
their authority in 2017, within the territory where they enjoyed autonomy, and by the rules of 
assembly they set—with none of these facets validated or controlled by the Spanish state. As 
the representationally elected parliamentary leadership, they claimed to represent the 
underlying Catalan political community in its quest for sovereign self-determination. When 
the referendum actually occurred just under one year later, the state violently challenged its 
legitimacy, rejecting the vote in the Spanish Supreme Court and calling the referendum a 
―constitutional and democratic atrocity‖ (Jones, 2017). As the actual voting began to unfold, 
Spain‘s security forces appeared ―in full riot gear, smashing their way into polling stations, 
dragging women out by the hair, and firing rubber bullets indiscriminately into crowds as they 
turned out to vote‖ (Mclaughlin, Rebeaza and Gyldenkerne, 2017). A more perfect image of a 
state formation exercising sovereign power against an emergent claim of sovereign self-
determination could hardly be imagined.  
 
Though the results of the referendum overwhelmingly favored independence (in excess of 
90%) the result was somewhat tainted by a boycott organized by political groups that opposed 
the referendum (Jones and Burgen, 2017). But beyond that, it was clear that the state regarded 
the entire process as invalid and illegal: not an act of self-determination, but a crime that it 
could legitimately halt. The representative organ claiming to ‗capture‘ the determining 
political energy of a Catalan secession clearly had little material ability to actually establish 
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sovereign control of the territory and secure recognition from other states, but it aggressively 
advanced the argument that the referendum‘s outcome destroyed Spanish legitimate control of 
the region. As we discussed in Part 2, in a temporally prior sense, a democratic referendum 
that established political will for independence in the territory might be regarded as the 
founding covenant of a Catalan state—but as a temporally present and future moment of 
determination, the contest moved back to the realm of state power and military control, which 
gave the advantage to the Kingdom of Spain and the determinism of the constituted state 
system. Because of the immanent tensions in the logic of sovereign self-determination, this 
posited one constitutional order against another entity claiming representational legitimacy, 
and gave way to a violent disagreement about the rules of assembly. 
 
In another sense, it was the latest outcome in a game of political elites— Raphael Minder 
(2017) traces the mainstream acceptance of outright Catalan secessionism among 
representative political leaders to an effort to capture popular political energy generated by the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. In Catalonia, center-right politicians like Jordi Pujol and 
Arthur Mas had long founded their political futures on ―moderate nationalism‖ and positioned 
their ‗Convergence‘ coalition as a careful voice in favor of Catalan autonomy (Minder, 2017, 
p. 2). Prior to his retirement in 2003, Pujol played a delicate hand, cutting a path between the 
state and more radical Catalan nationalist politicians, ―demanding (and often obtaining) more 
autonomy from Madrid,‖ and ―[pledging] allegiance to successive Spanish governments‖ in 
return (Ibid.). Socialist and center left governments saw electoral success in subsequent years, 
and finding it more difficult to consolidate power and retain the unity in the Convergence 
coalition, Mas harnessed sharper nationalist sentiment to propel him to electoral victory in 
2010 (Minder, 2017, p. 3). Later, he directly embraced outright secession after a surge of 
separatist movements in 2012 (Ibid.). At this stage, the platform of the center-right and leftist 
platforms that emerged following the financial crisis (most notably the Podemos movement), 
reached unlikely alignment in their quest to eliminate the sovereignty of the Spanish state in 
Catalonia. 
 
Minder quotes Catalan sociologist Marina Subirats i Martori in her assessment that the 
moment for this convergence was largely induced by the aftermath of the financial collapse, 
arguing that the case represents ―an economic crisis that becomes a crisis of politics and 
values in which people look for an exit from the current system‖ (Minder, 2017, p. 7). This 
opened a new opportunity for cooperation, but only in a very specific sense, because the 
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‗mainstream‘ Catalan representational order seeks only to ―get out of the Spanish system, as 
opposed to the Podemos answer, which is to say we should overturn the system‖ (Ibid.). But 
Franceso Salvini (2018) characterized this as a ―crisis of respective power positions,‖ that 
resulted in a common goal for the 2017 referendum, and a temporary convergence of two 
political subjectivities: one critical of the state formation and one advocating ‗closed 
possibilities of expressions in self-determination.‘ Secession offered a common moment of 
creative political optimism that ―promised change and prosperity,‖ when the economic and 
sociopolitical reality in the wake of the financial crisis felt like ―stagnation in a rotten Spain,‖ 
even when the respective political projects shared few other traits (Minder, 2017, p. 6).  
 
Carlos Prieto del Campo (2017) envisions the political projects of Catalan separatism as a 
phenomenon of contest embedded within a temporally limited convergence: an ‗expansive‘ 
moment of constitutive possibility opened up by popular anti-state sentiment, offering 
enormous possibility to create new political subjectivities from below, but existing 
momentarily within the same terms as an effort to reinforce the state form under a new set of 
actors (p. 10). He characterizes this ‗mini-crisis’ as nothing less than a test of self-
determination that could have wider ramifications than simply the political status of Catalonia 
(Ibid.). Indeed, it does generate questions about how new political realities may be constituted 
in temporal moments of intersection, opening possibilities for new accumulations of political 
agency and the creation of common subjectivity. Because the collectivity occurs not simply in 
the domain of a formal political program, but as a common imagined future, a new political 
reality emerges—not in the form of an ideological synthesis, but as a moment of transversal 
political subjectivity that may unleash a vector that neither actor originally envisioned. 
 
In his analysis of two political movements in Barcelona‘s El Raval neighborhood that 
assumed, challenged, and ultimately transformed institutional space, Salvini (2017) applies 
the idea of a ‗transversal‘ meeting of different conceptions of political society in the moments 
opened by these actions, which both reaffirms their fundamental differences, but also gestures 
to a common unity of will (p. 17). This is a transversal meeting in the sense that Deleuze 
(1964/1972) conceives a transversal as something that may ―…cause us to leap…from one 
world to another, from one word to another, without ever reducing the many to the One, 
without every gathering up the multiple into a whole, but affirming the original unity of 
precisely that multiplicity, affirming without uniting all these irreducible fragments‖ (p. 126). 
In a sense, this mirrors the recognition of the common position of a particularly rhizomatic 
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form of self-determination in the political crisis of Catalonia, even though the movements 
who share this transversal stem from fundamentally different genealogies of political structure 
and affiliation. Salvini construes the recent political ―invasions‖ that ―broke apart‖ the notion 
of civil society in similar terms (Salvini, 2017, p. 17). He writes:  
 
This approach allows one to operate in the institutional assemblage as a porous space: one 
where the processes of political emancipation aim not to separate the insides and the outsides 
of institutions. The problem around the autonomy of institutional politics is assumed and 
reversed. Institutional change is addressed as an active rupture within the institutional 
protocols and within the institution as a social body: a rupture that aims to include society not 
only as a deliberative actor through representation, but also as a multiplicity of agencies that 
intervene from outside and from within the institutional space (Salvini, 2017, p. 18).  
 
In a political space also shaped by these earlier interventions, leftist movements that oppose 
the state are locked in a transversal embrace with a Catalan separatist movement that opposes 
a particular state, but would readily claim legitimacy as another. This is more than a 
momentary alignment of political interests: these are disparate, irreducibly different political 
logics that reach the same emancipatory conclusion outside the logic of state control—largely 
because of the problematic tensions and totalities of classic self-determination.  
 
In an effort to legitimate its claim, the ‗mainstream‘ Catalan separatist movement must 
privilege the political right to self-create beyond the right of the state to maintain the status 
quo—it must, in a sense, acknowledge the existence of a political force beyond that which is 
already closed by the existing state system, even if upon becoming a state, the same actors 
would gladly desiccate this force within a constitutionally sovereign system. On the other 
hand, leftist political movements that wish to, as Prieto del Campo puts it, ‗subtract‘ the 
functions of public policy from the hierarchical logic of the state system and elite control, rely 
on the same constitutive basis to shape a new anti-systemic and bottom-up reality of political 
interaction (Prieto del Campo, 2017, pp. 51–52). This is especially the case as the Spanish 
government takes more direct control of the region following the referendum, thus pushing 
any calls for the destruction of Spanish sovereignty in Catalonia further away from constituted 
reality (Duarte, 2017). The transversal interaction occurs at a deeply normative level—the 
imagination of a political reality possible beyond what is already determined. But it is at the 
point that this imagination might be constrained within an institutional outcome that the 
transversal intersection would be terminated—so long as the question of Catalan secession is 
unresolved and these political subjectivities maintained, this transversality can continue to 
generate new possibilities.    
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4.2 Zapatistas and the Chiapas Rebellion: Deterritorializing the Struggle 
 
To many, the story of the Zapatista Uprising begins on January 1, 1994. On that day, 
approximately 3,000 masked gunmen entered towns in the Mexican state of Chiapas to seize 
power and declare war on the state (Villegas, 2017). In the town square of San Cristóbal de 
las Casas, the leader of these mysterious rebels issued directives and outlined the group‘s 
message: armed rebellion was the only option left for the indigenous populations of the 
region, who had been disenfranchised by centuries of domination and exploitation, and were 
still contending with those forces. The first day of 1994 was implementation day of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which the rebels called a ―death sentence‖ for the 
region, arguing that it was particularly devastating for the indigenous populations of resource-
rich Chiapas, who would be exposed to land grabs and the removal of natural resources from 
the region without benefit to their communities (Mentinis, 2006, p. xi). These rebels, 
identifying themselves as the Zapatista Army for National Liberation (EZLN), colloquially 
known as the ‗Zapatistas,‘ were comprised of mostly indigenous guerrillas who entered the 
towns demanding an end to domination by the state, occupied public spaces, freed prisoners, 
and set fire to several government buildings.  
 
For the Zapatistas themselves, the story began long before their armed uprising in January 
1994. The pattern of disenfranchisement that underpinned the uprising began five hundred 
years earlier, with the arrival of Cortés and the waves of European colonization and conquest. 
The Europeans brought weapons that could exert great force, carried lethal disease, and built a 
system to extract resources and enrich themselves and their societies at the expense of the 
social structures, bodies, and resources of those living in the region (Vodovnik, 2004, pp. 27–
29). The Chiapas rebellion was a reaction to the persistence of this great machine and its 
encasement in the neoliberal order—though being a region rich in oil, coffee, wood, food, and 
energy sources, Chiapas suffers from a high poverty rate, low access to health resources, and 
high unemployment (Ibid.). This dichotomy produced the pressure to challenge the structure 
of the state, especially as its integration into a globalized system of trade among other states 
was likely to expose this region to more economic marginalization—indeed, the removal of 
agriculture tariffs and government subsidies as part of NAFTA meant higher unemployment 
and the direction of capital flows above the reach of those in Chiapas (Imison, 2017). Instead, 
resources are harvested by large corporations and state organs that, in turn, provide payment 
via the region‘s scarce jobs, but can thus pay out rock-bottom wages in a region where a vast 
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majority of residents live below the poverty line (Vodovnik, 2004, p. 28). Rather than vesting 
the region with economic and social power, it continues the cycle of domination begun 
centuries earlier. 
 
The armed Zapatista rebellion, as such, might be understood as something less unique than 
the creation of a new political reality—after all, there is no shortage of rebellions and 
uprisings of the desperate and disenfranchised in the annals of Western history. And indeed, 
as the events of 1994 culminated in the state‘s swift reassertion of control in the towns and 
population centers, the armed conflict itself certainly failed to materially destroy the structures 
of domination and exploitation that the Zapatistas decried. But it did, however, produce what 
Mihalis Mentinis (2006) calls a ―strong shaking‖ in the situation—destabilizing the Mexican 
ruling elite and thrusting the criticisms of the globalized order to international recognition at 
an even more visible level than ever before (p. 99). Though the Zapatistas did not destroy the 
Mexican state, they continue to create and disseminate ideas about a possible political future. 
In short, their act of self-determination lies not just in their brief assertion of military control 
in January 1994, but in their decades-long project to constitute a cognitive vision of political 
possibility.  
 
But what is this vision, and how does its production and dissemination create vectors of 
political potentiality? By one turn, it sounds simple: oppose the hierarchical and exploitative 
structures of global capitalism and the state and champion ―land, dignity, and freedom‖ for 
the historically and continually marginalized (Mentinis, 2006, p. xi). But the Zapatista 
political project can also be understood as fundamentally challenging the state and neoliberal 
order by articulating a story of continuous domination by a particular constellation of people, 
forces, and systems, and invoking the power of collective imagination to conceive of a world 
beyond it. Gustavo Esteva (1997) writes that the Zapatistas ―gave legitimacy to a struggle for 
democracy that neither surrenders itself to its illusions nor aspires to a transitory or permanent 
despotic substitute; a struggle that does not aim to conquer the ‗democratic power‘ but to 
widen, strengthen and deepen the space where people can exert their own power.‖ This 
dimension of the Zapatista project is what might be considered the most radically anti-
institutional and rhizomatic.   
 
In a sense, the movement is a story of encounter. This encounter occurs not only between the 
indigenous groups and the gaze of Western society, as mediated through global information 
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flows, but also between the subjectivity of Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, the group‘s 
enigmatic and masked leader, and the indigenous cultures that comprise most of the Zapatista 
collectivity. Refusing to acknowledge his ‗real‘ identity, he nevertheless acknowledges his 
position as a former urbane intellectual who had entered the forest seeking to politicize the 
indigenous populations as a teacher of Marxist political ideas, but himself recognized the 
particularity of his own knowledge and became the student of the indigenous cosmo-vision. 
His writings, which comprise the lion‘s share of the group‘s post-1994 interaction with the 
‗modern‘ world, are often presented as poetic or allegorical communiqués that do not offer a 
binary rejection of the statist political project and establish arguments for a particular 
institutional political program, but address his transformative experience with encountering 
this new subjectivity. As Nick Higgins (2005) argues, ―his texts seek to reveal everything that 
has been excluded from the realm of official discourse in a way every bit as vital to the 
Zapatista revolution as the unexpected physical apparition of thousands of armed Indians that 
first made public the thin veneer of an inclusionary and developmentalist rhetoric upon which 
governmental claims to legitimacy had previously been based‖ (p. 88). The program of the 
Zapatistas, as such, was not simply based on the rationalities of the oppressing societies, but 
aimed to advance a ―cultural humanism‖ beyond the definitional scope of the Western 
institutional machine (Higgins, 2005, p. 87).  
 
This project, though part of the same struggle, is what many have argued sets the Zapatistas 
apart from other Latin American leftist movements. When the Zapatistas‘ project is 
understood apart from this rhizomatic subjective encounter, they are open to similar 
institutional critiques as other leftist movements. For example, in their particular rejection of 
the influence of global capital flows and the state formation, Mentitis argues that they have 
the tendency to become entrapped in the same ―reactive syllogism‖ of many Latin American 
movements, forcing them to ―resist global capitalism‘s proclamation of the nation-state‘s 
death‖ (Mentinis, 2006, p. 131). This means the embrace of some echoes of nationalism and 
territoriality and the assertion of ―ownership‖ of resources in a material and institutionally 
resonant sense in order to resist integration into a purely hierarchical system of global 
capitalism. For example, in his famous communiqué to Le Monde Diplomatique in 1997, 
Marcos discusses his vision of a neoliberal ―world war‖ occurring for conquest of new 
territories: 
 
One of its first victims has been the national market. Rather like a bullet fired inside a concrete 
room, the war unleashed by neoliberalism ricochets and ends by wounding the person who 
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fired it. One of the fundamental bases of the power of the modern capitalist state, the national 
market, is wiped out by the heavy artillery of the global finance economy. The new 
international capitalism renders national capitalism obsolete and effectively starves their 
public powers into extinction. The blow has been so brutal that sovereign states have lost the 
strength to defend their citizens‘ interests (Marcos, 1997). 
 
Does this argument valorize the nation-state formation? Clearly, to an extent, it does entail a 
historical reference to a past linkage between sovereignty and a community of national 
interest. But Mentitis aruges that this ―defense of the nation-state obscures who the enemy is, 
and disorients revolutionary energies‖ because ―the national struggle puts the emphasis on the 
nation itself, its continuity, its history, its importance for the people, and so on‖ (Mentinis, 
2006, p. 131). Much like other movements, when they are understood as a binary rejection of 
a particular facet of the modern state system, Zapatistas can thus become subject to critiques 
on the basis of their acceptance of another model of existing political community that also 
underpins a part of the very state system they see as responsible for their exploitation.  
 
This is why their moment of rhizomatic self-determination—the encounter between Marcos 
and the indigenous teachers of the jungle—is so important. It is a result of the collective 
creation of a new political reality, rather than his top-down ―teachings‖ that he intended to 
provide to the indigenous people of the jungle, and thus can be understood as a moment of 
rhizomatic self-determination. From this encounter, a collective power did emerge, announced 
itself, and departed the territorial plane before its outright destruction according to the logics 
of a simple military uprising. And after the brief occupation of Chiapas population centers 
ended and the Zapatistas retreated to the forest, the political vision could continue to take 
shape without material referents to what must be opposed or explained by military logic: 
instead, the process of ―cultural contamination‖ described by Marcos can be expanded and 
spread, which allows them ―…to reconsider our politics and the way in which we viewed our 
own historical process and the historical process of the nation‖ (Higgins, 2005, p. 92). While 
the movement has never disarmed and the state is still in a declared conflict with the group, 
their structures of political organization and thought have now coexisted with the Mexican 
state for almost 25 years. If this situation does not need to be encased in the binary contests of 
institutional or military power, it can continue to enter broader political consciousness through 
the opening it created in 1994, but survive as a manifestation of the revolutionary energy and 
constitutive power that might have to be enclosed or destroyed by the territorial ‗success‘ or 
‗failure‘ of a simple military insurgency to secure territorial control. 
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Clearly, for the Zapatistas, opposition of exploitation and degradation is not simply 
accomplished by capturing land, replacing the leaders of the Mexican state, and securing 
formal sovereignty or independence for the state of Chiapas. This is true not least because, by 
those terms, the Mexican state would be able to claim an unfettered and absolute victory in 
1994. Instead, the project moved away from the plane of territoriality (or at least, back into 
the ―desert of solitude‖ of the deep Lacondon Jungle), where the Zapatistas‘ collective vision 
of politics without exploitation or domination can continue to generate possibilities. Indeed, 
their experiments in community living and parallel social structures persist in many areas of 
Chiapas without state intervention, and today, the group still conducts global outreach and 
accepts visitors to Zapatista villages (Vidal, 2018). Their most powerful weapons are now the 
means of communication—the global press, visual images, and revolutionary symbology—
and their struggle lives on a largely deterritorialized plane. As non-indigenous members of 
capitalist societies also encounter and consider the possibility of a non-exploitative political 
future, the Zapatistas add political subjects to their collective vector of political self-
determination in a very different way—not simply with radios, facemasks, and guns—but 
within an ever-expanding collective imagination.  
 
4.3 Rojava: The Paradoxes and Perils of Institutionalized Autonomy 
 
The political experiment underway in the northeastern region of Syria is part of a bold, 
precipitous, and radically particular story. In 2012, the Syrian Democratic Union Party 
(PYD), aligned with the famous Kurdistan Worker‘s Party (PKK), gained control of three 
majority-Kurdish territories close to the Turkish border, establishing the Democratic 
Federation of Northern Syria, or Rojava (Leezenberg, 2016, p. 681). The PYD‘s military 
wing, known as Popular Protection Units (YPG), fought to recapture territory held by the 
Islamic State (IS), subsequently creating an opportunity to capitalize on the interests of the 
weakened Syrian state, as well as forge military partnerships with many external state actors 
that viewed IS as a potential threat to their own societies and sovereignty. In some narratives, 
the Syrian state was simply too weak to subsequently re-enclose the YPG‘s territorial gains 
within its sovereign authority, while others even claim there may have been an explicit deal 
conducted between the PYD and the Syrian state that tacitly allowed the former to enjoy total 
non-interference (Ibid.).  
 
Though these parcels of land were geographically dispersed and ethnically heterogeneous, the 
PYD continued efforts to capture territory from the IS, and within it, establish a series of 
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revolutionary political structures. The effect was the creation of a de facto ‗non‘-state and the 
paradoxical ‗imposition‘ of autonomy (Agence France-Presse, 2013). The implementation and 
defense of these institutions creates an opening to test a variety of ideas about democratic 
autonomy, women‘s liberation, and the dismantling of capitalist hierarchy in a material 
context, but it also unleashes a fierce debate about the directional production and reproduction 
of institutionalized revolution and the murky material realities of retaining territorial control 
in the midst of war.  
 
Three ‗cantons‘ comprise Rojava—their names roughly Anglicized to Jazeera, Afrin, and 
Euphrates—with an estimated total population of over 4 million inhabitants. These areas 
made up the lion‘s share of majority Kurdish areas within Syrian territory, but also contain 
large non-Kurdish populations that are formally included in the PYD‘s project. As such, it 
considers itself much more than just a Kurdish movement of national liberation (Knapp, 
Flach, and Ayboga, 2016, p. 2). To this end, ―the cantons recognize the languages that their 
inhabitants speak as official languages of the Canton,‖ and all religious practice (including 
Islam, Christianity, and the Yezidi religion) is recognized in Rojava, as well as the existence 
of secular non-believers (Hosseini, 2016, p. 257). The Rojavan project rejects the nation-state 
form and pretends no claims to formal statehood—however, it practices ‗self-defense‘ to 
―prevent massacres against the Syrian people, the death of human beings, the destruction of 
cities, forced migrations, looting and pillaging‖ (Kurdistan National Congress, 2014, p. 8). It 
is thus armed and highly organized. Because of this fact and its clear alliance with the PKK—
long viewed by Ankara to be an illegitimate terrorist organization—Rojava is considered a 
hostile target of the Turkish state. At the time of writing, Turkey is still engaged in ‗Operation 
Olive Branch‘, which has wrested territorial control in most of Afrin from the PYD, and 
occupied it since March 2018 (Williams, 2018). Turkey and its allies in the mission have been 
accused of displacing large swaths of the local population and forcibly converting Yazidis 
who refuse to flee (Cockburn, 2018). Many states that have otherwise collaborated with the 
YPG and affiliated groups in fighting IS acknowledge Turkey‘s concerns about Rojava as 
valid, but have been divided in their response. In fact, Turkish military action has generated 
waves of popular backlash and repression inside Turkey and created new frictions among 
Turkey and its NATO allies—perhaps most notably, the U.S. (Wintour, 2018). The PYD 
subsequently launched a concerted insurgent campaign, which continues to engage Turkish 
forces at the time of writing (Enders, 2018).  
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Despite, or perhaps partially because of, the surrounding turmoil, the political structures 
enacted in Rojava have been of a decidedly different nature than nearly all other institutional 
regimes that administer physical territory, de facto or otherwise, in the world. These projects 
are explicitly inspired by the writings of Abudullah Öcalan, the PKK leader who has long 
been serving a Turkish government prison sentence on the island of İmralı in the Marmara 
Sea. While imprisoned, Öcalan ―assessed the PKK‘s history and impact and began to criticize 
his party‘s record, becoming skeptical of its Stalinist outlook,‖ and sought new influences for 
the PKK‘s platform (Hosseini, 2016, p. 255). His discovery of the work of the relatively 
obscure American anarchist Murray Bookchin, and subsequent correspondence with him, led 
Öcalan to develop his theory of ‗democratic confederalism‘ between approximately 2001 and 
2004 (Ibid.). Here, Öcalan confronted the ‗cult of the state,‘ recognizing the ‗catastrophic 
consequences‘ of its influences on 20th century Marxist leaders, Stalin among them (Löwy, 
2017, p. 3). Per his new thinking, the classic hierarchical structures of the nation-state appear 
as part of an ―ideological monopoly‖ that is ―an indivisible part of the power monopoly,‖ 
which gestures to a radical shift in his position on a sovereign nation for the Kurdish people in 
the Middle East (Öcalan, 2011, p. 10).  
 
For Kurdish nationalists, who long counted the PKK among their most visible and active 
allies, Öcalan broke rank, declaring the dream of the Kurdish nation-state dead. Per his new 
conception, nationalism became as a false hope against an encroaching world of global 
capital—with the total and hierarchical state form now ―a vassal of the capitalist modernity 
which is more deeply entangled in the dominant structures of the capital than we usually tend 
to assume‖ (Öcalan, 2011, p. 13). As a result, ―regardless how nationalist the nation-state may 
present itself, it serves to the same extent the capitalist processes of exploitation‖ (Ibid.). 
Indeed, as the leader of a movement claiming to represent one of the largest stateless national 
populations in the world, it is possible to see how an argument can emerge that ―the ultimate 
victims of modern history‖ have been uniquely disenfranchised by the state system (Kurdistan 
National Congress, 2014, p. 5). But how, then, could institutional structures be evolved to 
govern territory they have secured?  
 
Öcalan‘s answer draws its origin from Bookchin and his idea of Political Ecology, which 
conceives of a human ‗first‘ (biological) nature leading naturally to a rise of a ‗second‘ 
(social) nature of hierarchy and institutionalization (Bookchin, 2006, pp. 26–27). It is 
possible, as such, to conceive of problems of war and politics as intertwined with those of 
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ecology, and in effect recognize the ―emergence of the social out of the biological, of second 
nature out of first nature,‖ making human political reality ―open-endedly innovative, and able 
to ―[transcend] its relatively narrow capacity to adapt only to a pregiven set of environmental 
conditions‖ (Bookchin, 2006, p. 28-29). As such, Bookchin‘s theory is permeated both by a 
recognition of total constitutive possibility, but also by a distinct historical materialism that 
allows it to specifically ―[challenge] the entire system of domination itself – its economy, its 
misuse of technics, its administrative apparatus, its degradations of political life, its 
destruction of the city as a center of cultural development, indeed the entire panoply of its 
moral hypocrisies and defiling of the human spirit‖ (Bookchin, 2006, p. 46). Thus, it 
ultimately ―seeks to eliminate the hierarchical and class edifices that have imposed 
themselves on humanity and defined the relationship between nonhuman and human nature‖ 
(Ibid.).  
 
Inspired by Bookchin‘s embrace of a ―living politics‖—direct, localized, and personal 
deliberation, Öcalan envisioned a form of political assembly wherein ―all groups of the 
society and all cultural identities can express themselves in local meetings, general 
conventions and councils‖ (Öcalan, 2011, p. 26). Central to Öcalan‘s idea is also the issue of 
women‘s liberation, which he sees as inexorably tied to the same hierarchical statist system 
that political ecology looks beyond. He writes:  
 
The history of the loss of freedom is at the same time the history of how woman lost her 
position and vanished from history. It is the history of how the dominant male, with all his 
gods and servants, rulers and subordinates, his economy, science and arts, obtained power. 
Woman‘s downfall and loss is thus the downfall and loss of the whole of society, with the 
resultant sexist society. The sexist male is so keen on constructing his social dominance over 
woman that he turns any contact with her into a show of dominance. The depth of woman‗s 
enslavement and the intentional masking of this fact is thus closely linked to the rise within a 
society of hierarchical and statist power (Öcalan, 2013, p. 10). 
 
Institutionalizing this constellation of disparate influences and ideas, particularly in a climate 
of ever-looming war, is obviously a complex and controversial project. Rojava‘s three cantons 
retain wide-ranging control of their own structures of political assembly, but several 
fundamental elements are shared in common (Kurdistan National Congress, 2014, p. 12). 
First, political structures throughout Rojava practice a principle of ‗dual leadership,‘ which 
holds that ―everywhere, leadership is vested in two people, and one of them must be a 
woman‖ (Knapp et al., 2016, p. 69). From mayoral positions to council seats, positions that 
might otherwise be held by a single person (most likely a man) must be held by two people. 
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Even basic political positions are thus formulated by consensus. A quota system also applies 
for female participation in ―mixed gender institutions‖ as well—at least 40% of each 
institution must be comprised of women (Ibid). This project extends to the armed forces, and 
the images of Rojava‘s all-female Women‘s Defense Units (YPJ) are frequently cited as some 
of the most stirring symbols of the Rojava project worldwide (Nordland, 2018). Within 
Rojava, they are intended to ―signal a transcendence of gender differences, and insofar as they 
are perceived as a threat to men, [endanger] male privilege,‖ challenging the deeply 
patriarchal social structures that pervade the region (Knapp et al., 2016, p. 138).  
 
Additionally, all of Rojava‘s political structures are primarily based on the idea of 
‗democratic autonomy,‘ vesting agency in ―the commune, the community, as an anti-centrist, 
bottom-up approach; the commune is the political center of self government, the unit that 
integrates neighborhoods…‖ (Knapp et al., 2016, pp. 43–44). This manifests itself in the 
formation of ‗democratic councils,‘ which aim to be as local and direct as possible (Knapp, et 
al., 2016, p. 42). They are organized on the basis of a neighborhood, village, or city and are 
charged with implementing their own local solutions to questions of society, politics, 
education, self-defense, agriculture, and economics (Collectif Marseille-Rojava, 2014, p. 25). 
Rojavan political bodies pay special attention to the multi-ethnic makeup of the population in 
the territory, though the ―hostility and mistrust among these different communities are not 
easily overcome‖ after decades of differential treatment under Syria‘s Ba‘athist regime 
(Cemgil and Hoffmann, 2016, p. 64).  
 
Though these structures embody the principles of democratic confederalism, as a political 
formation that controls and administers territory and faces down ideological enemies, Rojava 
still confronts many of the problems of democratic institutionalism discussed in Part 3. The 
PYD‘s assertion of control was unequivocally a military outcome, and its internal 
maintenance of control relies, to some extent, on the accumulation of coercive capability 
against those it embraces as members of its project. Indeed, in this way, Rojava must in some 
way reproduce the totalitarian logic of classic, bounded political community if it is to succeed 
in its articulated goal to self-defend and survive as a political entity. In a material sense, it has 
been accused by global human rights watchdog organizations of ―arbitrary arrests, abuse in 
detention, due process violations, unsolved disappearances and killings, and the use of 
children in PYD security forces‖ (Human Rights Watch, 2014). This is in addition to 
accusations of ―forced displacement and home demolitions‖ in areas that had been previously 
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held by the IS, which the PYD justifies in terms of ‗military necessity‘ (Amnesty 
International, 2015).  
 
This raises several questions: in what regard does the persistence of Rojava succumb to the 
temporal issue of ‗terminating‘ revolution? Does its maintenance of institutional political 
control too closely resemble the sovereign logic of the state? And perhaps most crucial for its 
territorial survival: how much of Rojava‘s political support directly stems from its military 
successes against the IS? Certainly, in the case of the U.S. and other state allies in the 
campaign against IS, the alliance is transparently uneasy and strategic, but this may also be 
the case for some internal allies. For example, some of its armed minority units have openly 
expressed a distinct ―lack of interest in the Kurdish social revolution‖ to foreign reporters, 
characterizing their participation as ―revenge for the indignities‖ of IS occupation, rather than 
a reflection of their sympathy to the political structures of Rojava (Mogelson, 2017).  
 
The ability of Rojava to extend collective subjectivity without systemic coercion is likely to 
be a core facet of its revolutionary survival—as Cemgil and Hoffman (2016) point out, ―a 
central contradiction in the project is that the main target of this attempted social 
transformation, hierarchy, is also deeply wedded to the condition of its emergence through a 
necessary militarization under conditions of armed struggle‖ (p. 70). And, while organized 
political opposition is present in Rojava, it remains unclear what social or structural elements 
of the Rojavan political project are ‗non-negotiable,‘ particularly while its military forces 
remain the key guarantor of security and liberty for opposition groups against common threats 
(Collectif Marseille-Rojava, 2014, p. 28). Plus, as Michiel Leezenberg (2016) points out, 
Rojava has evolved a number of ‗state-like‘ mechanisms of leadership and potential violence. 
He argues that, ―the PYD constitutes a Leninist vanguard based on a strictly organized party 
structure and backed by a strong military wing and security apparatus,‖ which has 
―reproduced the PKK‘s Stalinist personality cult around Öcalan‖ (p. 685). In his view, ―these 
organizational features seem at odds with Bookchin‘s anarchist emphasis on grass-roots 
organization‖ (Ibid.). This may also represent a lack of intellectual plurality that manifests, 
among other ways, in a deeply binary and particular conception of ―women‘s liberation‖ that 
effaces the struggles of queer and other vulnerable minorities in Rojava (Ghazzawi, 2017). 
 
One potential means of imagining this case as an exercise of rhizomatic self-determination 
(rather than simply a classically flawed reproduction of binary statist logic) is to distinguish 
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the Rojavan project as an imagined political reality from its engagement with other logics of 
control, even though its creators and leaders may, to some extent, implicitly embrace these 
logics themselves. Anahita Hosseini (2016) applies Alain Badiou‘s theory of ‗the Event‘ to 
Rojava, in that it emerged unpredictably and directly induced into existence a new ‗Truth‘ by 
its occurrence. She writes:  
    
Rojava is an almost textbook example of an Event in our era, an Event which, in its 
efflorescence, is endeavoring to establish a new social order. As an Event it is surrounded by 
the anti-Events of nationalism, fundamentalism and totalitarianism which are trying to devour 
it. Yet unlike its IS rival, Rojava came into existence without sabre-rattling and military 
rhetoric, it appeared unexpectedly and unpredictably (as is to be expected in Badiou‘s 
understanding of an Event), in the midst of a situation where all hope seemed to be lost. Since 
then it has slowly and steadily set out on the path of creating an alternative social model. 
Despite all the odds, it has survived and thrived for almost three years now, inspiring new 
optimism within the context of what otherwise appears to be a desperate political impasse 
(Hosseini, 2016, p. 260). 
 
Though, perhaps in the intervening years since Hosseini‘s article, Rojava has developed new 
entanglements with its surrounding ‗anti-Events,‘ her characterization of its founding bears 
strong echoes to the notion of rhizomatic self-determination. Indeed, as she points out, its 
unlikely situational emergence and bold political imagination mean that ―the conscious 
subjects of Rojava have moved well beyond a mere reaction against IS and are showing signs 
of a true ‗desire‘ for life,‖ and that in doing so, they ―have confronted head-on the 
Machiavellian Fortuna, which has emerged from the ruins of war and chaos, [seizing] it to 
create a new social order [and] hope amongst those who were losing it‖ (Hosseini, 2016, p. 
263). Perhaps, in this sense, Abdullah Öcalan, the Kurds of Syria, or Rojava‘s administrative 
leaders are not the protagonists of this determining moment. Instead, rhizomatic selfhood may 
be understood as emerging within the collective subjectivity constituted by Rojava‘s 
founding, which in turn, can stay alive within the hope for its emancipatory political future, 
rather than within the flawed functions of an institutional machine it inspired. 
 
4.4 Plurinationality in Bolivia and Ecuador: A Transformative Encounter 
 
For the past decade, the South American states of Bolivia and Ecuador have functioned under 
new constitutional arrangements that came about as a result of collaboration with indigenous 
activists and social movements. Like many new constitutions, they now contain procedural 
and structural updates to the state function and rules of assembly, but they are unique in their 
incorporation of core principles proposed by the indigenous groups involved in their creation. 
Crucially, they were redesigned to embody the notion of plurinationality, which entails the 
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recognition of a fundamental diversity of cultures and perspectives inside the state and the 
defense of this diversity in all public institutions (Acosta, 2009, p. 17). The philosophical 
program underpinning this principle went much further than a recognition of formal 
subjective equality among ‗citizens‘—in this fundamental ‗refoundation‘ of the state, the 
constitutions recognized the existence of alternative conceptions of economic and political 
relations that were, in turn, underpinned by a fundamentally different conceptions of existence 
and the relational links between individual, society, and nature (Sousa Santos, 2010, p. 14). 
This extends far beyond the notion of multiculturalism in its Western sense, and instead 
embraces ―multiple forms of democracy and new forms of citizenship‖ that provide 
―indigenous social movement groups the ability to be ‗equal‘ on their own terms, along with 
tools they can use to enforce these rights‖ (Lupien, 2011, p. 790). Yet, these movements 
largely also view the state system itself and its hierarchical incorporation in an globally 
extractive capitalist structure to be the result of the same forces of colonial domination and 
cultural ‗epistemicide‘ that created the conditions of social domination inside Bolivia and 
Ecuador (Sousa Santos, 2014, p. 149). This raises the question: how can opposition to the 
state form and global capitalist system exist within the same political program that advocates 
collaboration with the state to enshrine additional rights in the very contractual order that 
legitimates the state‘s existence, as well as its agency in the international system? The 
approach must, in this sense, be necessarily rhizomatic and avoid the logical trap of totality—
after all, a binary and omnitemporal rejection of the state would invalidate the entire project 
of constitutionalizing plurinationality within it. But, in a time of ‗strong questions and weak 
answers‘ vis-à-vis a powerful paradigm of modernity, the recognition of universalism as 
‗another form of particularity‘ creates an opening for possibilities that might otherwise seem 
contradictory (Acosta, 2009, p. 24). Indeed, indigenous activists and academics hope that this 
might even include a genuine transformation of the state formation in its encounter with other 
political imaginations. 
 
Lupien (2011) surveys the political programs of various Bolivian and Ecuadorian indigenous 
groups, and finds that ―economic and social rights, land redistribution, and anti-globalization 
have been embraced by both indigenous and other social movement groups, who tend to share 
the perspective that democracy is impossible without a more equitable distribution of wealth, 
land and resources‖ (pp. 775–776). Though there are certainly differences in their individual 
aims, the common embrace of plurinationality among these groups is predicated on 
―participatory democracy, local decision-making, communal ownership of land and the 
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capacity to exercise full citizenship without abandoning cultural practices,‖ which themselves 
derive from ―indigenous peoples‘ right to live according to their own norms and customs as 
pre-colonial peoples and inheritors of great civilizations‖ (Lupien, 2011, p. 776). Relative to 
the dominant forms of economic and political control, they all share a common moment of 
categorization: the ‗invention of the Indian‘ by Spanish and Portuguese colonizers, whose 
assertion of a superior sense of ‗nature, society, and the universe‘ lent justification to models 
of exploitation under the guise of spreading ‗civilization‘ to these fundamentally othered 
peoples (Bárcenas, 2011, p. 76). Indigenous activists recognize the inheritance of the state 
formation as a disguised continuation of this project—because modern constitutionalist logics 
of popular sovereignty exercised by a unified, homogenous people result in an effectively 
‗mono-cultural‘ state, which necessarily effaces the existence of other worldviews and 
collectives that might also exist within (Sousa Santos, 2009, p. 33). 
 
The effort to influence state constitutions and ‗refound‘ the state on a plurinational basis 
began recognizably in the 1980s, but indigenous political organizations began interacting with 
state governments at least two decades before (Lupien, 2011, pp. 776–777). In Bolivia, Evo 
Morales became the first indigenous president in 2006, formalizing what James Dunkerley 
(2007) calls ―a self-confident indigenous presence in the management of broad parts of public 
life‖ in the country (p. 136). The electoral win was carried largely because his Movement for 
Socialism (MAS) party sufficiently navigated divisions among indigenous movements and 
―succeeded in gaining the support of Bolivia‘s indigenous population in both the Andes and 
the lowlands‖ (Lupien, 2011, p. 778). Sousa Santos (2010) argues that this had the effect of 
reversing the process of ‗protagonism‘ of the struggle for indigenous rights moving away 
from the groups themselves to the domain of the ‗executive,‘ thereby diluting the original 
demands for fundamental reform (p. 104). Nevertheless, while Morales and the MAS party 
agenda did explicitly include the convention of a Constitutional Assembly with the aim of 
rewriting the constitution, the party‘s interest in challenging the foundational elements of the 
state and economic structure were initially outweighed by a desire to produce immediate 
shifts in wealth distribution and living conditions in the country using existing economic 
structures (Dunkerley, 2007, p. 144). Thus, pressure for more foundational reforms continued 
to originate from indigenous groups that were now included in a Constitutional Assembly and 
whose ‗radical discourse‘ finally generated the opportunity to more deeply incorporate 
plurinationality into the constitution with the stated aim of decolonizing the conceptions of 
politics, society, and economy in the country (Gamboa Rocabado, 2009, p. 21).  
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In Ecuador, strong pressure for reform came from the Confederation of Indigenous 
Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), which was founded in 1986 as a composite group of 
several earlier indigenous movements (Lupien, 2011, p. 776). CONAIE and its allied groups 
in the ‗Pachakutik‘ movement executed uprisings and mobilizations in the 1990s and 2000s, 
and successfully ―elected several indigenous members to congress‖ despite a smaller 
indigenous-identifying percentage of the total population of the state than in Bolivia (Clark 
and Becker, 2007, p. 2). Pachakutik also successfully aligned itself with ―other leftist forces,‖ 
and following his election in 2007, socialist president Rafael Correa convened a successful 
referendum to establish a Constituent Assembly to produce a new Ecuadorian constitution 
that would better reflect the demands of indigenous groups (Lupien, 2011, p. 777). During the 
drafting process of the constitution, ―the Constituent Assembly received a frequent (almost 
constant) flow of representatives from indigenous organizations determined to keep the 
pressure on asambleístas‖ to represent the full scope of the movement‘s priorities (Lupien, 
2011, p. 779). With the passage of the new constitution and its overall impact on state politics, 
Clark and Becker (2007) argue that the actions of indigenous groups in Ecuador rendered 
them ―central to the processes of Ecuadorian state formation, rather than simply the recipients 
of state policy,‖ and that their ―political strategies sometimes affected state policy by 
stretching the meaning of government discourse, and in the process, transforming it‖ (p. 4).  
 
In Lupien‘s reading, though the Bolivian constitution ―goes further in meeting specifically 
indigenous demands,‖ in both cases, the resulting constitutions shared a number of formal and 
institutional similarities that derive directly from the interaction of the state with indigenous 
activist platforms (Lupien, 2011, p. 792). In addition to the formal recognition of 
plurinationality, both new constitutions provide for more direct processes of local decision-
making and rights to natural resources, which have previously been rejected by the state 
government (Lupien, 2011, p. 793). They also allow for ‗intercultural‘ structures of education 
that allow for instruction in indigenous languages and the incorporation of non-Western 
epistemology in the curriculum (Sousa Santos, 2010, p. 167). Crucially, both embrace the 
notion of Buen Vivir (the ‗good life‘), which conceives of the right to communal and natural 
wellbeing as equally important as that of the possessive individual (Bravo Chávez, 2009, p. 
142). This notion also ―assumes and respects differences and complementarities among 
human beings and between humans and non- humans from an ecological perspective, 
emphasizing the principles of reciprocity, complementarity and relationality in human 
interactions and in relation to the cycles of nature‖ (Merino, 2016, p. 273). Functionally, this 
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allows indigenous movements to ―articulate their politics of self-determination towards a 
process of state transformation‖ within a notion that provides for different, non-structural 
conceptions of political organization among particular groups, but expresses a shared 
commitment to collective concepts beyond Western models of economic and political 
organization (Merino, 2016, p. 272).  
 
This concept is crucial in understanding why these movements evolved to interact 
collaboratively with the state at all. Certainly, though the state now formally recognizes the 
existence of a plurality of protected cultures on a deeper basis than by conferring classic 
‗minority‘ protections, it still exercises absolute sovereign within its territory (Bravo Chávez, 
2009, p. 139). And, in the logic of both the Bolivian and Ecuadorian states, the process of 
accumulating localized needs, problems, and outlooks into representative groups is still 
formalized and protected within the formal framework of a particular set of rules of assembly, 
renewing the covenant authorizing the state to act both internally and externally in the 
interests of its own self-preservation in the event that those rules are violated. Certainly, as 
Clark and Becker point out in Ecuador, ―the concept of the state that emerges… is one in 
which many conflicting interests and projects coexist‖ (Clark and Becker, 2007, p. 6).  
 
Perhaps the most confounding material problem stemming from this dynamic is the 
dimension of resource ownership. As both Ecuador and Bolivia retain commodities-driven 
economies, environmentally extractive practices are the engines of their conventional 
‗development‘ programs, and so, if ―the financing of all programs continues to be based on 
conventional development ideas of the appropriation of nature and the maintenance of the 
pattern of exportation of natural resources,‖ then, ―increases in social spending make the 
governments even more dependent on exporting minerals and hydrocarbons‖ (Merino 2016, 
p. 275). Kröger and Lalander (2016) trace the dynamics of constitutionality to resource 
extraction, arguing that constitutions function to protect de jure rights of formal protection, 
but that communities must still protect de facto land rights beyond the state framework when 
their conceptions of resource usage differs from that of the liberal state function (p. 688). 
Thus, as is the case in Bolivia, the new constitution makes the case for government 
nationalization of extractive industries—particularly since it asserts that the rights of 
indigenous communities are now fully embraced within the constitutional order—meaning 
that the land right ―de jure function works better when communities face private sector 
extractivism than when confronting land grabbing conducted by the state (or actors closely 
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associated with the state, such as key commodity exporters)‖ (Kröger and Lalander, 2016, p. 
696).  
 
Certainly, these are not outcomes that indigenous groups, particularly those with the sharpest 
criticisms of the global capitalist system, would celebrate. However, the key to understanding 
why this collective political project even occurs is the non-binary possibility of 
plurinationality and buen vivir—these notions hold that the state is not a universally positive 
or a negative entity, but that its logic can be transformed. It need not be always be hierarchical 
or extractive, or always embrace neoliberal notions of human development. Instead, by 
changing its very fabric, the codes that spell domination for indigenous communities can be 
altered, and new possibilities for a political future can be unlocked. As Sousa Santos writes: 
 
What is promising at the beginning of the new millennium is that the ralliers for good 
living/buen vivir have created possibilities not previously foreseen or deemed admissible 
theoretically. These new possibilities show that irrationality is not the only alternative to what 
is currently considered rational, that chaos is not the only alternative to order, and that concern 
about what is less than true (the messy reasons and affections underlying the struggles for 
uncertain results) must be balanced by concern about what is more than true (the habitus of 
disproved grand theories of claiming truthfulness in their explanations of previous failures). 
The new possibilities emerge from new actions acted out by new players with new discourses 
and conceptions. They are actually not new; some of them are very old indeed; they are 
ancestral. They became more visible because they only stress what is useful for our struggles. 
Our times are not flat or concentric; they are passages between the No Longer and the Not Yet 
(Sousa Santos, 2014, pp. 26–27). 
 
This is precisely what makes this project rhizomatic. If the state and its logic are conceived as 
universal and transcendental, the very idea of plurinationality seems absurd, or at least 
painfully naïve. But if the state is conceived as a particular system with particular rules, it 
becomes possible to see that those rules might be changed. Certainly, this is aided by 
embracing the multiplicity implied by buen vivir, which recognizes that what is valuable is 
more than just our individual rationality: it is all the myriad ways of knowing that we receive 
or can devise. Instead of a misguided episode of political co-option, that means that we might 
recognize the ‗constellation‘ of different ‗lexicons, narratives, and imaginations‘ that exist 
within indigenous culture, and recognize the creative power they can wield (Sousa Santos, 
2009, p. 47). Thus, beyond the incorporation of a ‗class,‘ ‗nation,‘ or ‗minority‘ interest in a 
constitutional order, the effort to ‗refound‘ the state is the construction of autonomy and 
subjectivity in collective will (Bárcenas, 2011, p. 74). Surely, state logic has not yet been 
entirely transformed by this encounter with indigenous political imaginations, but this does 
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not mean these efforts have failed. Instead, the new constitutions of Bolivia and Ecuador 
might be understood not as the termination of these possibilities, but as their beginning.  
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5 Conclusion 
 
Writing has nothing to do with signifying. It has to do with surveying, mapping, even 
realms that are yet to come. 
 
- From ―A Thousand Plateaus‖ by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 1980/1987 
 
Beyond the boundaries of the ‗known,‘ political creativity takes on the darkly exciting 
character of endless possibility. Acts of ‗rhizomatic‘ self-determination, as I have discussed 
them, are those that manifest constituent power as subtractions from the multiple, thereby 
creating a subjective ‗self‘ and a new political logic. They are, as we saw in the previous 
section, not always easily characterized within the Western vernacular, chiefly because they 
might be situated outside of it. Today, inside of a geographically expansive state and 
economic system, buttressed by powerful epistemologies and algorithms, they might even 
seem irrelevant or laughably utopic. Yet, they are crucial to the study of politics, because acts 
of self-determination are how we got here.  
 
In Part 2, I discussed how the narrative of the state system relies on a form of this notion to 
persist. Today, the international legal system invokes a ‗right to self-determination‘ in the 
same breath as a state‘s right to sovereignty, but the former is vaguely defined even within 
this regime. This mainstream approximation of ‗self-determination‘ evolved alongside notions 
of the modern state, growing to encompass both notions of civic pluralism, as well as those of 
nationalism, and it was applied most forcefully in the process of post-colonial state building. 
Now, the debate has shifted to essentially equate ‗self-determination‘ with ‗secession‘ from 
existing states, because nearly all habitable territory on Earth is administered under a 
particular state‘s sovereignty and no consensus exists as to what criteria would constitute a 
universally homogenous political ‗self‘ that might legitimately ‗determine.‘ A state‘s right to 
deploy violence to defend its continued existence is justified on the basis of a prior moment in 
which a political community has defined itself and its contract with the state. This logic 
implies that the fundamental bounds of these arrangements are set in perpetuity—new claims 
of self-determination are met with force legitimized by old ones, turning determination into 
determinism inside the ontological bounds of the state system. 
 
When, in Part 3, I argued that if we could relax these assumptions of the state‘s totality, we 
could then imagine the state formation itself as a particularity. This allowed us to explore 
arguments about what ‗self-determination‘ means relative to the notion of multiplicity, and 
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how new political scripts could be generated by acts of collective will, rather than simply 
relative to arrangements of formal statehood. I argued that we should imagine these acts as 
‗rhizomatic,‘ rather than ‗alternative,‘ to avoid the trap of imagining the mirror-image of what 
already exists in service of establishing a critique of it. In searching for material examples of 
these acts, I also argued that we should search for ongoing vectors of political possibility, 
some of which may be difficult to align with a Western frame of analysis, instead of 
attempting to predict what may emerge.  
 
In Part 4, I attempted to identify a few such instances. We visited four cases of recent 
rhizomatic self-determination: the transversal intersection of movements seeking to eliminate 
Spanish sovereignty in Catalonia, the deterritorialized project of the Zapatistas, the paradoxes 
faced by the political formation in Rojava, and the project to transform two South American 
states to embrace the notion of plurinationality. For each, we considered how the collective 
actors generated new political codes, the challenges they mounted to the constituted state 
system, and how their political potential lies beyond the binary logic of secessionist self-
determination.  
 
Many of these acts first appear contradictory. But, if we embrace the notion of multiplicity, 
these contradictions become paradoxes, and acting on them opens new vectors of possibility. 
In Cannibal Metaphysics, Viveiros de Castro points to this notion of multiplicity as a key to 
unlocking the potential of non-constituted thought, both in anthropology and beyond. He 
writes: 
 
It has opened a line of flight between those two dualisms that have functioned as the walls of 
[anthropology‘s] epistemological prison from the time of its origins in the darkness of the 18th 
and 19
th
 centuries: Nature and Culture and Individual and Society, those ―ultimate mental 
frameworks of the discipline‖ that ostensibly could never be false, since it is by means of them 
that we think the true and false. But could that really be all? Frameworks change, and the 
possibilities of thought change with them (the ideas of what thinking and the thinkable are 
change, and the very idea of a framework changes as the framework of ideas does). The 
concept of multiplicity may have only become thinkable—and therefore thinkable by 
anthropology—because we are currently entering a nonmerologic, postplural world where we 
have never been modern: a world that, more through disinterest than any Aufhebung, is 
leaving in the dust the old infernal distinction between the One and the Multiple that governed 
so many dualisms (Viveiros de Castro, 2010/2014, p. 108). 
 
Self-determination, when imagined beyond the state system, is how new political realities can 
be subtracted from the multiple. What I have considered as examples of ‗rhizomatic‘ self-
determination are, in effect, bold moments of political imagination, but the state, too, is 
 69 
imagined. It is an organizing logic, and a powerful one at that. It marshals vast material 
forces, but it is not itself material—teachers, parliaments, coins, tanks, schools, television 
towers, politicians, soldiers, and flags follow its lead, but it exists only in us. It is because we 
imagine it to be—and we can imagine many things. 
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6 Abstract in the Slovenian Language 
 
Otopeli determinizem: prevrednotenje samoodločbe onkraj nacionalne suverenosti 
 
Termin samoodločbe je zapisan v ustanovitvenih dokumentih večine drţavnih ustav ter 
mednarodnega prava, prav tako pa predstavlja sredstvo za legitimizacijo drţave ter 
nadnacionalnega reda. Točna definicija in njeni parametri pa so v resnici stvar debate, ne 
glede na to ali izhajajo iz logike notranjosti drţavniškega sistema ali iz logike njegove 
zunanjosti. Magistrsko delo najprej sledi ―klasičnemu‖ pojmu samoodločbe v njegovi 
zgodovinski partikularnosti znotraj mednarodnega sistema, pri čemer poudari veliko napetost 
med samoodločbo in drţavno suverenostjo. Nakar se obrne h kritični politični teoriji, da bi 
izkopalo definicijo samoodločbe, pri kateri popusti poseben odnos samoodločbe z drţavnim 
sistemom in pojmom suverenosti. Takšno pojmovanje samoodločbe je za potrebe naloge 
poimenovano ―rizomatično‖ in se nato uporabi pri analizi štirih primerov z namenom, da se 
pokaţe, kako lahko tak pojem samoodločbe uporabimo za razumevanje moţnosti, ki jih 
vzpostavljajo najnovejša politična gibanja. Temeljni argument magistrskega dela je, da ko jih 
razumemo v okvirju drţavnega sistema kot sedanjo ali prihodnjo ―aktivno‖ pravico, se dejanja 
samoodločbe zreducirajo na normativni determinizem zgodovinsko kontingentnih odnosov 
sil, saj se bodisi ujamejo v pogoje obstoječih dejavnikov znotraj konstituiranega sistema 
bodisi njihovo uresničitev pogojuje učinkovitost sile, ki jo lahko izvršujejo, da bi izničili 
funkcije sistema, ki slonijo na obstoječih pravilih. Ko pa jo razumemo onkraj zaprte logike 
drţavnega sistema, lahko samoodločba pomeni izraţanje neomejene konstituirajoče oblasti in 
kolektivne imaginacije, ki sprosti nove vektorje moţnosti človeških političnih odnosov. 
 
V nalogi najprej začnem z določanjem definicijskih koordinat »klasične« suverene 
samoodločbe in preučim poseben odnos med samoodločbo in koncepti naroda, nacionalizma 
in dekolonizacije. Nato predstavim osrednji problem suverene samoodločbe, ki prikazuje 
glavne napetosti, značilne za ta pristop. Na koncu tega poglavja se ukvarjam z nedavno 
pravno literaturo o uporabi načela samoodločbe v zahtevah po suverenosti, vendar 
navsezadnje trdim, da se lahko nove ali nepriznane zahteve po suvereni samoodločbi razrešijo 
bodisi na način, ki ponavlja ţe obstoječa razmerja sil v trenutnem sistemu, bodisi se izmerijo 
glede na zmoţnost akterja, da izvede nasilje nad obstoječo ureditvijo. 
 
Nato obravnavam ideje iz kritične politične teorije, zlasti obujanje političnih idej Barucha 
Spinoze, ki so navdihnile mislece, kot so Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Jacques Rancière, 
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Antonio Negri in Michael Hardt. Začnem s preučevanjem pojma konstituirajoče oblasti v 
pisanju Negrija, nato pa nadaljujem s preučevanjem odnosa med tem pojmom in idejo o 
"samoodločbi", pri čemer trdim, da jo je v njeni neskončni generativni moţnosti najbolje 
razumeti z uporabo idej multiplicitete in rizoma Deleuzeja in Guattarija. Pri tem skiciram t. i. 
"rizomatično" samoodločbo oziroma tista dejanja, ki izraţajo konstituirajočo oblast z 
ustvarjanjem novih pojmov političnega, ki prej še niso obstajali. Problem subjektivnosti 
obravnavam tako, da se obrnem na Rancièra in trdim, da se »sebstvo« v tem konceptu 
proizvaja hkrati z novo logiko političnega reda. Nazadnje preučujem omejitve uporabe te 
ideje v pomembnejših študijah primerov in  obravnavam ideje Boaventure de Sousa Santosa s 
priznavanjem potrebe po preseganju zahodnih političnih oblik političnega ustroja za 
razkrivanje prihodnosti s preučevanjem vektorjev političnih moţnosti, ki so bile ustvarjene 
pred kratkim, namesto da poskušamo projicirati našo obstoječo logiko za »napovedovanje« 
oblike prihodnjih dejanj rizomatske samoodločbe.  
 
Na koncu predstavim štiri kratke študije primerov, od katerih vsaka vključuje kolektivno 
zahtevo po politični samoodločbi. Pri pregledovanju vsakega primera obravnavam njegove 
vzporednice z "rizomatično" idejo, ki je prikazana v 3. delu, in preučujem, kako bi bil 
posamezen primer razumljen glede na drţavni sistem in binarno logiko, zaradi katerih bi sicer 
lahko postal protisloven. Najprej obravnavam presečišče dveh političnih idej v Kataloniji, ki 
ustvarjata nov potencial za sodelovanje in politično ustvarjalnost. Nato obravnavam gibanje 
Zapatistov v Mehiki, s katerim napreduje ontološki projekt, ki preteţno presega nivo 
ozemeljskega nadzora in vojaškega tekmovanja z drţavo. V nadaljevanju preučujem primer 
Rojave, reţima de facto avtonomije v severni Siriji, ki zagovarja demokratično avtonomijo od 
spodaj navzgor in protisistemsko vodenje, vendar se sooča s številnimi »drţavi lastnimi« 
izzivi pri ohranjanju celovitega ozemeljskega nadzora. Nazadnje obravnavam gibanja v 
Ekvadorju in Boliviji, ki si prizadevajo za temeljito preoblikovanje drţave na podlagi 
plurinacionalnosti in s priznavanjem svetovnih nazorov in kulture domorodnih skupin v 
drţavi. 
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